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Abstract 
The weak participation in output markets and poor access to risk management tools for 
farm and non-farm enterprises stand as major impediments to the sustainable provision and 
access to food in developing countries. Rural households incur substantial transaction costs to 
reach output markets. In addition to their effect on market access, high transaction costs could 
also hinder the delivery of financial services that could presumably enable efficient risk 
management. Thanks to their low cost, security and rapid delivery features, digital payments 
present tremendous potential to improve the rural enterprise environment. However, little 
evidence is known about the potential role of digital payments in output market efficiency and 
risk management. Essay 1 focuses on digital payments and market participation while Essay 2 
explores how digital payments can contribute to building resilience to income shocks. 
In Essay 1, we develop and test a conceptual model in which digital payments improve 
market participation by lowering transaction costs. Here we show that the use of mobile money 
is associated with a reduction of information asymmetry around the buyer type and a large gain 
in welfare for distant market participants. The predictions of the conceptual model are 
empirically tested using an instrumental variable approach and secondary data from a cross-
sectional survey conducted by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) in Cote 
d’Ivoire and Tanzania. A special regressor model estimates the probability of distant market 
participation increases on average by 55 percentage points for mobile money users. Furthermore, 
we rank marketing venues based on hold-up risk and find that the effect of mobile money is most 
prominent for decisions to switch from village to local market sales outlets. Our results 
demonstrate how farm and non-farm enterprise owners would benefit from the spread and access 
to digital payments beyond the traditional pathway of credit, savings, and remittances. 
  
Essay 2 attempts to understand how digital payments enhance risk management 
capabilities and contribute to building household resilience to future shocks. Our outcome of 
interest is the Barret and Constas (BC) development resilience measure that embodies the 
capacity of a household to avoid falling below a threshold poverty level in the face of shocks and 
stressors. We first construct a multidimensional index of well-being based on productive asset 
holdings and empirically investigate the effect of mobile money on household development 
resilience using a conditional moment approach.  The dataset exploited consists of secondary 
data from a 4 rounds panel of households representative of the national population of Kenya. We 
found that a 10 km reduction in the distance separating households from the nearest mobile 
money retailer results in a percentage point increase in development resilience. Moreover, 
wealthier households are more likely to benefit from higher access to mobile money. When 
facing severe shocks, mobile money users were found capable of sustaining a higher probability 
of exceeding the asset poverty line than their non-user counterparts. The findings of Essay 2 
establish new evidence on the long-run effect of digital payments. 
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interest is the Barret and Constas (BC) development resilience measure that embodies the 
capacity of a household to avoid falling below a threshold poverty level in the face of shocks and 
stressors. We first construct a multidimensional index of well-being based on productive asset 
holdings and empirically investigate the effect of mobile money on household development 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 Food security has become a major topic of concern in the last decades. The risk of food 
insecurity brought by the growing population projected to hit 9 billion by 2050 stresses the 
urgent need for improved access to and more efficient use of capital and markets. This rapid 
demographic growth mainly takes place in developing countries where over 40% of the active 
population work in the agricultural sector (World Bank, 2017). Addressing the challenges of 
agriculture mitigates the threat of food insecurity while improving the livelihood of vulnerable 
communities. Although beneficial to vulnerable communities in the short-run, numerous 
programs and initiatives revolving around the transfer of assets, cash or inputs have faced the 
persistent issue of sustainability. Some types of interventions that promote self-employment 
seem to establish lasting but small improvement in welfare (Banerjee et al., 2015). 
 Knowledge and information have always played a major role in agriculture (World Bank, 
2017) and income-generating activities in rural areas. Whether at the production, management or 
marketing level, households that have better access to information and knowledge are likely to 
make the best decision that makes a lasting impact on their livelihood. Agriculture is becoming 
increasingly knowledge-intensive, especially with the multiple challenges caused by weather-
related shocks, high food price volatility and inefficient supply chains (FAO and ITU, 2016). As 
with the industrial revolution that fostered enormous gain in cost and efficiency and gave a big 
push to all aspects of humanity, the digital revolution has the potential to impact agriculture and 
food security by reducing the cost of information and exchange. The large scale adoption of such 
technologies in the last decade has paved the way for the development of mobile-based services 
that could be leveraged to provide market-driven solutions to smallholders’ agricultural 
challenges. Unlike transfer based programs and interventions that can potentially generate 
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negative externalities or general equilibrium effects, digital-based solutions are driven by the 
spontaneous adoption of mobile phones. The benefits of this type of solution are best expressed 
in the argument of the economist William Easterly summarized as: “When markets are free and 
the incentives are right, people can find ways to solve their problems” (Banerjee and Duflo, 
2012).  
Digital payments present three well-known advantages to their users in developing countries. 
First, they provide a quasi-instantaneous and accessible method to transfer money at low cost 
with few investments needed compared to other informal methods such as in person or through a 
bus driver, or more formal methods provided by banking and related institutions. Second, digital 
payments allow the unbanked to access financial services such as credit and savings that would 
be otherwise unreachable. Finally, they generate valuable data for credit profiling and other 
usages which allow offering tailored services to rural populations. Because of their potential 
impact on household livelihoods, there is a growing interest in digital payments.  Yet, the 
empirical literature in this area is still nascent and relatively unvaried. This dissertation 
investigates the impact of digital payments in two key areas that have received scant attention 
from the literature: (i) Output market access and (ii) risk management.  
Our contribution to the digital payments literature is twofold. First, in essay 1 we provide a 
methodological contribution to the existing body of work. The impact of digital payments to 
rural development in a broad sense has always been explored from the perspective of their low 
cost of transfer. In this vein, Suri and Jack (2016), Munyegera and Matsumoto (2016) and 
Kikulwe et al. (2014) provide solid empirical evidence of the enhanced welfare resulting from 
the cost-saving feature of mobile money. However, when digital payments are merely perceived 
as instruments to reduce the cost or to increase the speed of money transfers, their welfare effect 
3 
could hardly be separated from intrinsic savings or risk-sharing behaviors exhibited by the 
individual of interest prior to using the technology. Because digital technologies fundamentally 
cut the cost of information, one would expect these technologies to influence the transaction 
costs resulting from the lack of information by one of both of the transacting parties. Our study 
examines the welfare effect of mobile money using the framework of transaction costs 
economics, which allows us to leapfrog the basic cost-reducing function of mobile money. By 
testing this novel methodological approach in two leading mobile money adopting countries, we 
provide empirical evidence of the transaction cost reduction pathway of mobile money. 
Essay 2 provides new evidence of the longer-run effect of mobile money. Existing studies 
focus on the short-term effects of mobile money, one exception being Suri and Jack (2016). 
Either the lack of datasets spanning over a sufficiently long period or the focus on a short run 
outcome explains the relatively scarce literature on the long-run effects of mobile money. In this 
study, we employ a novel measurement of resilience to understand what could be the impact of 
mobile money on an outcome that predicts a long run state of welfare. Our outcome of interest is 
the Barret and Constas (BC) development resilience metric that particularly embodies the 
capacity of a household to avoid falling below a threshold poverty level in the face of shocks and 
stressors. In addition, by focusing on productive assets, this study provides evidence of a positive 
relationship between mobile money and risk management of income-generating activities. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first study that utilizes the concept of development resilience to 
investigate the effects of digital payments. 
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Figure 1.1 Registered Mobile Money Accounts  
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Chapter 2 - Mobile money, Signaling, and Market Participation: 
Evidence from Tanzania and Cote d’Ivoire 
 Introduction 
Market participation has been shown to improve rural household income (Alene et al., 
2008; Olwande et al., 2015), however for many smallholder agricultural producers in developing 
economies market access remains constrained by high transaction costs. Policy initiatives such as 
price subsidies and infrastructure investments have yielded mixed results in enhancing market 
participation (Poole, 2017).  Recent empirical evidence from studies in Central America, Eastern 
Europe, and Sub Saharan Africa has shown that the costs associated with transportation and 
aggregation only partially explain low levels of market participation (Olwande et al. 2015, Hellin 
et al., 2009). In the transaction cost economics literature, a significant proportion of market 
linkage failures has been attributed to costs associated with information asymmetry and potential 
opportunistic behavior of transacting parties (Blandon et al., 2009). This is particularly true in 
countries with underdeveloped or inadequate market information systems and public 
enforcement mechanisms. Consequently, policymakers, agribusiness, and agricultural 
development scholars are in a continuous search for innovative solutions for reducing 
information asymmetry and facilitating market linkages based on private enforcement 
mechanisms (Guo and Jolly, 2008; Narrod et al., 2009; Sartorius and Kirsten, 2007). 
 Mobile money and welfare effects 
The digital revolution in the last decade has paved the way for wide-scale adoption of 
digital technologies such as mobile technologies that could be leveraged to provide market-
driven solutions to smallholders’ agricultural challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa. Mobile money, a 
money transfer technology that was first popularized in Kenya, not only offers banking products 
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to previously unbanked households but also provides a fast and low-cost money transfer method 
to facilitate market transactions. The potential solution that digital technologies can provide to 
smallholder’s issues is demonstrated by the growing literature around digital technologies in 
agriculture and their contribution to smallholders’ welfare. Most of the work regarding digital 
technologies rely on success stories and case studies of digital application that improve farmers’ 
welfare. Protopop and Shanoyan (2016) is a collection of successful applications of digital 
technologies in the agri-food industry of developing countries. Since the advent of mobile money 
services in 2007, a handful of econometric studies have investigated their economic impact in 
Kenya and found a positive effect. Reflecting this, Mbiti and Weil (2011) concluded that mobile 
money contributes to decreasing the price of traditional money transfer services and improving 
financial inclusion in Kenya. The welfare effect of mobile money was assessed by Jack and Suri 
(2014), Kikulwe et al. (2014), Munyegera and Matsumoto (2016), Suri and Jack (2016) in Kenya 
and Uganda. They found that mobile money increased consumption by 13% (Munyegera and 
Matsumoto, 2016) and 12% (Suri and Jack, 2016). Along the same lines, Jack and Suri (2014) 
found that mobile money users were more resilient to economic shocks than their non-user 
counterparts.  
A common finding in the previous literature is that mobile money mainly affects welfare 
through the pathway of remittance or money transfer from a relative. The lower cost of mobile 
money transactions relative to traditional money transfer methods results in a higher frequency 
of money transfers and a more diverse pool of senders (Jack and Suri, 2014). With the increasing 
number of agents available to process money transactions, households receive money transfers 
more frequently, which positively affects their consumption and resilience to economic shocks. 
Two other pathways were mentioned in the mobile money literature: savings and increased 
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market participation. While the savings pathway is discussed in most econometric and case 
studies, the output market impact pathway was considered only in Kikulwe et al. (2014). They 
found that mobile money users commercialized 19% more products than their non-user 
counterparts. Yet, their study discusses the impact of mobile money on market participation 
based upon the mechanism of remittances that would ease the liquidity constraints on 
commercialization. In fact, market participation is rather considered as an outcome in their study. 
This ultimately leads to distinguishing only two pathways through which mobile money may 
affect welfare. While this is a growing area of interest by policymakers and industry 
stakeholders, the literature remains underdeveloped with most research to date focusing on the 
effect of mobile money on welfare through pathways of remittance and improved access to 
capital.  Many questions remain unanswered regarding the role of mobile money in facilitating 
market participation by reducing the associated transaction costs. 
 Mobile money and transaction costs 
The main benefit of using the mobile money technology is its lower cost of transferring 
money between individuals located far from each other. But the concept of transaction cost in 
agricultural marketing goes beyond the mere cost of transferring money. Key et al. (2000) and 
Bellemare and Barrett (2006) discussed two types of transaction costs. The proportional 
transaction costs include the per-unit cost of accessing markets and are generally associated with 
transportation and handling while the fixed transaction costs include (a) the cost of searching for 
a customer with the best price, (b) negotiation and bargaining, (c) screening, monitoring and 
enforcing an agreement. Another description by Poole (2017) categorized transaction costs as 
visible and invisible, the latter consisting of search cost and enforcement costs. One strategy to 
reducing transaction costs consists of lowering the cost of the physical access to markets by 
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improving the institutional and physical infrastructure of the external environment. Another 
strategy consists of mitigating the costs associated with finding a buyer and/or ex-ante 
investments to improve the ability of ex-post enforcement in case of violation of the prior 
agreement by one of the parties (i.e. hold-up). While various interventions have focused on 
reducing search costs by connecting farmers to buyers (market information systems), ex-post 
enforcement costs have barely been addressed despite their potential to impede market 
participation. The existing enforcement instruments are mostly public and generally inefficient 
due to the inadequate legal infrastructure around agricultural markets in the developing world. 
However, there is emerging literature pointing out the importance of building trust in market 
transactions to avoid or mitigate ex-post enforcement costs. Signaling, which involves revealing 
private information about one of the parties, has particularly been found to improve market 
participation by reinforcing trust between sellers and buyers (Granja and Wollni, 2019). Our 
study evaluates how the mobile money technology can serve as a signaling mechanism to 
alleviate the uncertainty around the buyer type and improve smallholder market participation  
Transaction costs can be affected by mobile money in various ways. Digital technologies 
in general and digital payments, in particular, are characterized by their potential to reduce the 
cost of information. That is, they facilitate information exchange. Thanks to its fast and secure 
payment feature, mobile money can potentially enable buyers and sellers to illustrate their 
commitment to completing a transaction through various signaling and screening mechanisms. 
The main objective is to determine whether mobile money can constitute an effective mechanism 
to alleviate the risk for hold-up that smallholders face in their decision to participate in distant 
markets, reducing the transaction costs of market participation. To investigate this relationship, 
we exploit a cross-sectional household survey that provides mobile money usage data for 
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smallholders in two countries: Cote d’Ivoire and Tanzania. The model is empirically estimated 
using a special regressor approach. The study adds to the literature by establishing support for 
the existence of a third pathway through which mobile money may impact welfare and market 
participation. 
The remaining of the study is structured as follows. We develop a conceptual model that 
explains the potential impact of mobile money on market participation in the next section. Then 
we lay out the empirical analysis and the results and discussion. Finally, we discuss the 
generalizability of the findings along with ideas about further research around this framework in 
the conclusion. 
 Methods and data 
 Conceptual model 
In this section, we develop a theoretical framework that explains how mobile money can 
affect a net seller farmer’s choice between a village market (v) and a distant market (d) 1 for 
selling the production surplus. The distant market offers better terms (e.g. price) but has inherent 
substantial transaction costs that would incur any seller opting for this market. While the village 
market presents lower transaction costs, it offers less attractive terms than the distant market. The 
seller’s problem is to select the market that maximizes her profit. 
Let’s start by examining a one-shot game scenario where one seller and one buyer 
commit to complete a single commodity transaction in a distant market. In this model, the village 
market transaction is viewed as a default option that determines the seller’s reservation utility. 
                                                 
1 In all subsequent notations, the subscript d is associated with distant markets while the subscript v is associated 
with village market. 
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The extension of the model to include repeated-games and multiple buyers will be discussed later 
in the section. 
In a one-shot game, the seller derives a profit 𝑆 from the distant market sale at a price 𝑃𝐷 
after she incurs some transportation cost 𝑀 and transaction cost 𝑇𝐶. The transaction cost 𝑇𝐶 
arises from a) search cost associated with finding a suitable buyer (e.g. time and resources spent 
while searching for a buyer), b) hold-up cost associated with losses due to ex-post renegotiation 
of terms by an opportunistic buyer, and c) ex-ante investments of time and resources to prevent 
potential hold-up and improve seller’s ability for ex-post contract enforcement2. In the 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) literature the term hold-up is defined as ex-post 
renegotiation of contract terms by one of the transacting parties in an attempt to extract quasi-
rents from another party (Klein, 1996). Quasi-rents arise from the transaction-specific 
investments and are defined as the difference in profits between the agreed-upon transaction and 
the next-best alternative (Klein et al., 1978; Shanoyan et al., 2014). The buyer acquires from the 
seller some agricultural products of perceived value 𝑉 in the distant market while paying her the 
competitive price 𝑃𝐷. The seller will choose to participate in the distant market only if the price 
offered in the distant market is greater than the price she can obtain in the village market 𝑃𝑣 
added to the transportation cost 𝑀. This condition can formally be represented as follows: 𝑃𝐷 =
𝑃𝑣 + 𝑥 + 𝑀 where 𝑥 is a very small non-zero value. With the distant price offered being at least 
𝑃𝐷, the farmer will spend 𝑀 to transport the product to the distant market. Let 𝑞 be the 
probability of hold-up. Hold-up will occur (𝑞 = 1) if the buyer chooses to offer a lower price 
after the farmer has incurred the transportation cost and delivered the product to the distant 
                                                 
2 Please see Key et al. (2000) for detailed treatment of Transaction Costs 
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market. The lowest hold-up price 𝑃𝐷ℎ acceptable by the seller must yield a higher profit than the 
next best option of transporting the product back and selling it in the village. This condition can 
be formally represented as 𝑃𝐷ℎ = 𝑃𝑣 + 𝑥 − 𝑀.  
 Incentive structure without mobile money 
To complete a transaction in the distant market, seller and buyer must engage in a sequential 
game summarized as follows: 
          
The Buyer in a 
distant market 
offers 𝑃𝐷  
The seller accepts 
offer if 𝑃𝐷 = 𝑃𝑣 +
𝑥 + 𝑀 where 𝑥 >
0  
The seller incurs 𝑀 
to deliver the good 
to distant market  
The Buyer offers 
𝑃𝐷 if no hold-up 
(q=0) or 𝑃𝐷ℎ if 
hold-up occurs  
(q=1) 
If q=1, the Seller 
accepts hold-up 
price if 𝑃𝐷ℎ = 𝑃𝑣 +
𝑥 − 𝑀. If q=0, seller 
accepts 𝑃𝐷ℎ and the 
transaction is 
completed 
 
 In deciding which market to choose, the seller is considering the following payoff 
options: 
𝐸[𝑆𝑑] = [(1 − 𝑞)(𝑃𝐷 − 𝑀)] + [𝑞(𝑃𝐷ℎ − 𝑀)] =  [(1 − 𝑞)(𝑃𝑣 + 𝑥 + 𝑀 − 𝑀)] +
[𝑞(𝑃𝑣 + 𝑥 − 𝑀 − 𝑀)] =  [(1 − 𝑞)(𝑃𝑣 + 𝑥)] + [𝑞(𝑃𝑣 + 𝑥 − 2𝑀)] = 𝑃𝑣 + 𝑥 − 2𝑞𝑀  
(expected profit from distant market)        (1) 
𝑆𝑣 = 𝑃𝑣 (profit from the village market)       
 (2) 
Therefore, at any 𝑀 > 0, the farmer will choose to sell in the distant market only if she can be 
guaranteed that 𝑞 = 0. 
If the buyer chooses to hold up the transaction, she will receive 𝜋𝐷ℎ =  𝑉 − 𝑃𝑣 − 𝑥 + 2𝑀. 
Without hold-up, the buyer will receive   𝜋𝐷 =  𝑉 − 𝑃𝑣 − 𝑥 − 𝑀. It is clear that under this 
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incentive structure the buyer will always choose to hold up (𝑞 = 1) since 𝜋𝐷ℎ > 𝜋𝐷. Thus the 
seller will expect 𝑞 = 1 and will always choose to sell in the village market resulting in a sub-
optimal equilibrium of 𝑆 = 𝑃𝑣 and 𝜋 = 0.  
 Incentive structure with mobile money 
The introduction of mobile money allows for a down payment which reduces the 
likelihood of hold-up. In the TCE literature, these types of mechanisms are referred to as mutual 
hostages or private enforcement capital (Williamson, 1983). Essentially, the buyer has to provide 
a sufficient amount of down payment that will ensure to the seller a higher distant market payoff 
than the village market payoff even if hold-up occurs (𝑞 = 1). At the distant market, the seller 
has already incurred the sunk cost 𝑀 when comparing the prices offered in the two scenarios: 
selling at the distant market (𝑃𝑣 + 𝑥 + 𝑀) or returning the products to the village market (𝑃𝑣 −
𝑀). It follows that the optimal down payment that would guarantee a distant market pay-off at 
least equal to the village market pay-off is 2𝑀.  The resulting sequential game with mobile 
money enabled down payment is summarized as follows: 
            
The Buyer in a 
distant market 
offers 𝑃𝐷  
The seller 
accepts offer if 
𝑃𝐷 =𝑃𝑣 + 𝑥 + 𝑀 
where 𝑥 > 0, 
and asks buyer 
to transfer 2M 
down payment 
The Buyer 
transfers 2𝑀 
through Mobile 
Money 
The seller 
incurs 𝑀 in 
transportation 
costs 
The Buyer 
offers 𝑃𝐷 if no 
hold-up (q=0) 
or 𝑃𝐷ℎ if hold-
up occurs  
(q=1) 
The Seller 
returns 2M if no 
hold-up or 
keeps 2𝑀 if 
hold-up  
 
If the buyer signals her commitment to complete the transaction through mobile money, the 
seller obtains the same pay-off regardless of him being offered a hold-up price or competitive 
price by the buyer. Under the down payment arrangement, the buyer will receive the same payoff 
14 
regardless of her choice to hold up or not: the buyer has no longer any incentive to hold the seller 
up. The mobile money transfer of a down payment from buyer to seller will signal a hold-up free 
transaction to the seller, providing her an incentive to opt for the distant market. The actual 
completion of the transaction on the distant market moves buyer and seller out of the sub-optimal 
equilibrium in (2) and yields a higher equilibrium with new respective payoffs of 𝑆𝑑 = 𝑃𝑣 + 𝑥 
and 𝜋 = 𝑉 − 𝑃𝑣 − 𝑥 − 𝑀. It is worthwhile to mention that the seller’s payoff is unchanged, 
whether she receives a hold-up price or not. In the case the seller receives a competitive price 
after the down payment transfer, her final payoff consists of  𝑃𝑣 + 𝑥 + 2𝑀 − 𝟐𝑴 = 𝑃𝑣 + 𝑥, since 
the seller has no reason to retain the down payment amount (2𝑀) transferred up-front to 
guarantee a hold-up free transaction. When facing a hold-up price after the down payment 
transfer, the seller buffers herself against the cost of hold-up by retaining 2𝑀.  
Table 2.1 presents the agents' payoff matrix under the possible alternatives of no hold-up and 
hold-up. 
Table 2.1 Payoff matrix 
 
 No hold up (𝒒 = 𝟎, 𝑻𝑪 = 𝟎) Hold up (𝒒 = 𝟏, 𝑻𝑪 > 𝟎) 
 Without Mobile money 
Seller 𝑆𝐷 = 𝑃𝐷 − 𝑀 =  𝑃𝑣 + 𝑥 𝑆𝐷 = 𝑃𝐷ℎ − 𝑀 =  𝑃𝑣 + 𝑥 − 2𝑀 
Buyer 𝜋𝐷 =  𝑉 − 𝑃𝑣 − 𝑥 − 𝑀 𝜋𝐷ℎ =  𝑉 − 𝑃𝑣 − 𝑥 + 2𝑀 
 With Mobile Money 
Seller 𝑆𝐷 = 𝑃𝐷 + 2𝑀 − 2𝑀 =  𝑃𝑣 + 𝑥 𝑆𝐷ℎ = 𝑃𝐷ℎ + 2𝑀 =  𝑃𝑣 + 𝑥 
Buyer 𝜋𝐷 =  𝑉 − 𝑃𝐷 − 2𝑀 + 2𝑀
= 𝑉 − 𝑃𝑣 − 𝑥 − 𝑀 
𝜋𝐷ℎ =  𝑉 − 𝑃𝐷ℎ − 2𝑀
= 𝑉 − 𝑃𝑣 − 𝑥 − 𝑀 
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The conceptual model predicts that the use of mobile money will alleviate the risk for 
hold-up and improve distant market participation. 
 
 Repeated games 
The two incentive structures addressed above deal with a one-shot game. The underlying 
hold-up problem is presented from the perspective of a seller’s risk of facing an opportunistic 
behavior from the buyer, assuming a risk-averse seller and a risk-neutral buyer. In reality, buyers 
who engage in a transaction with sellers are exposed to hold-up costs that could arise from the 
delivery of lower quality products or a missing delivery after the down payment is transferred to 
the seller. In this case, the buyer may not engage in the transaction, fearing to lose her down 
payment. The repeated game setting provides the conditions for the use of private enforcement 
capital defined by Gow and Swinnen (2001) as the losses that one of the parties would incur as a 
result of contract termination and reputational damage. In a repeated game, buyer and seller 
engage in a long term contractual arrangement where the cost of breaching the contract (hold-up) 
increases the self-reinforcing range of contractual arrangement, enhancing the overall reliability 
of the transaction (Shanoyan et al. 2016). The private enforcement capital allows us to relax 
buyer’s risk neutrality assumption in a repeated game.  
The buyer-seller contract in a repeated game can be depicted as a principal-agent 
situation where the principal (buyer) rewards the seller for honoring the contract. The short-run 
Nash equilibrium derived from the one-shot game is typically inefficient since there is another 
pair of moves from the two parties that yields a higher expected utility for both the seller and the 
buyer (Radner, 1985). This would correspond to the seller delivering a lower quality of products 
or retaining the down payment without honoring the contract. But when buyer-seller transactions 
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are repeated, the incentives are better distributed over time (Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo, 
1997). This is made possible by the buyer’s opportunity to penalize the seller for departure from 
their previous transaction agreement. Radner (1985) demonstrates that the repeated game 
increases the efficiency of the Nash equilibrium - that is, the repeated game precludes any sub-
optimal behavior that would threat the future payoff of both parties, even if they discount their 
future expected utility.  
To illustrate this result, let’s consider the buyer’s discounted expected utility in period t: 
𝑈 = (1 − 𝛿) ∑ 𝛿𝑡−1𝑈𝑡
∞
𝑡=1
                                                                                                            (1) 
where seller and buyer have the same discount factor 𝛿 and the seller has a similar expected 
utility function Q. For every pair of one period efficient expected utility (?̂?, ?̂?) superior to the 
one-period expected utility from the actual moves (𝑈∗, 𝑄∗), such that ?̂? > 𝑈∗ and ?̂? > 𝑄∗, there 
exists a discount factor 𝛿 that yields a repeated game equilibrium sufficiently close to the one 
period efficient expected utility (?̂?, ?̂?) (Radner, 1985). A direct implication is that the resulting 
incentives are comparable to those of the static model above, that it, the incentive structure with 
mobile money leads to an optimal equilibrium under the assumption of a low discount factor 𝛿. 
However, this conclusion cannot be drawn from the model in (1) when the seller foregoes her 
future profit (𝛿 high). But a high discount rate constitutes a special case, like many others for 
which the model should be adjusted. From the conceptual model above, the following hypothesis 
can be formulated - H1: Mobile money improves market participation. Testing this hypothesis 
will consist of comparing the rate of distant market sales across mobile money users and non-
users. If the hypothesis holds, we should observe a higher rate of distant market sales among 
mobile money users. 
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 Data 
The analysis is based on the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor’s Smallholder 
Household Survey (CGAP-SHS), a nationally representative survey implemented in 5 African 
countries: Cote d’Ivoire, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda. The main advantage of 
the CGAP-SHS is to incorporate a detailed agricultural module to the financial inclusion survey, 
unlike several surveys that cover mobile payment systems. From the 5 African countries covered 
in the survey, only three countries presented sufficient mobile money observations: Cote 
d’Ivoire, Tanzania, and Uganda. Due to a missing key, the Uganda survey was removed from the 
sample, leading to a final sample comprised of 6,175 households from Cote d’Ivoire and 
Tanzania. The households surveyed were farming dependent in terms of livelihood. They were 
identified on the basis of 9 criteria: market orientation, landholding size, labor input, income, 
farming system, farm management responsibility capacity, legal aspects and level of 
organization. Relying on responses from farming dependent households to understand mobile 
money usage allows us to relate mobile money usage decision to farming behavior, which is 
critical to investigate the mechanism through which mobile money affect market participation.    
The Cote d’Ivoire sample covers three agricultural zones of the country: East Forest, 
West Forest, and Savanna. Of 3,333 households targeted by the survey, 3,019 were successfully 
interviewed in Cote d’Ivoire, resulting in an attrition rate of 9.42%.  In Tanzania, 3,156 were 
initially targeted in 5 regions defined for the purpose of the survey: Border, Coastal, Inland, 
Lake, and Zanzibar. The interview was successfully conducted for 2,993 households out of 
3,156, resulting in an attrition rate of 5.16%. In each household, an adult (age 15 and over) was 
randomly selected and surveyed among the active household members. 
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Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics on key variables disaggregated by mobile 
money usage for commercial purposes. Mobile money users resemble their non-user counterpart 
to a large extent. Household heads aged on average 39 years among users, slightly younger than 
non-users. Household size averaged 5 members in both groups, each of which owned about the 
same area of land: 50 acres. Gender, years of education and farming experience of household 
heads were comparable across users and non-users sub-groups. Users were nonetheless slightly 
less experienced and more educated than their non-users counterparts. The most noticeable 
difference between the two groups relates to farming and marketing practices. A higher 
percentage of users were distant market participants, with a difference of 18 percentage points 
between the two groups. The other salient distinctive characteristic between users and non-users 
was the average monthly income earned by each household. Users monthly revenue exceeded 
non-users earnings by USD 44 on average, despite a slightly larger land area owned by non-
users. However, the users’ group was made of 13% more livestock owners than non-users. Cell 
phone ownership exhibits a small variation across groups, with only one cellphone owned on 
average in both groups. The users’ group accounts for slightly more cell phone owners than the 
non-users group. Finally, major differences in geographic location were noticeable between the 
two groups. As expected, a higher proportion of urban households were mobile money users 
relative to rural households. Also, Cote d’Ivoire had a higher percentage of mobile money users 
than Tanzania.   
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Table 2.2 Data summary statistics by mobile money usage 
 Mean by mobile money usage  
Variable 
Non-users 
Mean          N 
Users 
   Mean         N 
Difference in 
means 
Selling to distant market 0.39 1908 0.56 133 -0.17*** 
(dummy = 1 if true) (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Male 0.60 2378 0.65 170 -0.05 
(dummy = 1 if true) (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Education in years 5.39 1742 5.96 130 -0.57 
 (0.08)  (0.32)  (0.32) 
Age 41.17 2378 39.94 170 1.22 
 (0.29)  (0.89)  (1.09) 
Household size 5.21 2378 5.19 170 0.01 
 (0.06)  (0.18)  (0.22) 
Income (US$ equivalent) 126.92 2284 170.90 165 -43.98*** 
 (3.69)  (32.05)  (16.19) 
Land size in acres 51.94 2214 49.21 148 2.73 
 (1.3)  (5.14)  (5.19) 
Years of farming experience 11.02 2192 10.00 149 1.02** 
 (0.11)  (0.43)  (0.43) 
Cooperative membership 0.08 2200 0.08 151 0** 
(dummy = 1 if true) (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Receive price information 6.44 2200 10.43 151 -3.99*** 
(dummy = 1 if true) (0.25)  (1.14)  (1.02) 
Grow rice 0.68 2214 0.75 148 -0.07* 
(dummy = 1 if true) (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Owns livestock 0.48 2214 0.61 148 -0.13*** 
(dummy = 1 if true) (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Rural 0.68 2378 0.52 170 0.16*** 
(dummy = 1 if true) (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Country 0.57 2378 0.64 170 -0.07** 
(dummy = 1 Cote d’Ivoire) (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Number of mobile phones 1.13 2157 1.25 165 -0.12*** 
in households (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
***, ** and * denote respectively significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
 
  
20 
Next, Table 2.3 presents the summary statistics by distant market participation. A few 
patterns are worthy to be mentioned.  Distant market participants and their non-participant 
counterparts share common demographics. Gender, Education, age and household size fall 
within the same value ranges across groups. As to farming practices, the two groups were made 
of similar proportions of cooperative members and livestock owners, with household heads 
averaging 11 years of farming experience in both groups. A larger share of distant market 
participants were mobile money users. The proportion of mobile money users among distant 
market participants is about twice the proportion of users among non-participants who resided 
for the most in rural areas. Surprisingly, non-participants owned on average 11 more acres of 
land than distant market participants. Figure 1 summarizes the main barriers to distant market 
participation reported by surveyed households. About 70% of the surveyed net seller farmers 
opting for local markets reported fear of opportunistic behavior from buyers as the main reason 
that motivates their local market choice.  
  
 
Figure 2.1 Main reasons for opting for local markets 
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Table 2.3 Summary statistics by distant market participation 
  By distance  
Variable 
Local 
  Mean          N 
Distant 
   Mean           N Difference 
Mobile money 0.05 1227 0.09 814 -0.04*** 
(dummy = 1 if true) (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Male 0.58 2835 0.59 1753 -0.01 
(dummy = 1 if true) (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Education 4.53 1554 4.8 1060 -0.26** 
 (0.08)  (0.1)  (0.13) 
Age 42.09 2835 41.29 1753 0.80* 
 (0.28)  (0.35)  (0.45) 
Household size 5.26 2835 5.47 1753 -0.21** 
 (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.09) 
Income 119.02 2680 112.73 1660 6.29 
 (4.53)  (3.28)  (6.31) 
Land size in acres 64.30 2835 52.74 1753 11.56*** 
 (1.18)  (1.4)  (1.86) 
Year of farming experience 11.67 2783 11.17 1712 0.50*** 
 (0.09)  (0.12)  (0.15) 
Cooperative 0.09 2798 0.07 1724 0.02 
(dummy = 1 if true) (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Receive price information 5.40 2798 6.71 1724 -1.31*** 
(dummy = 1 if true) (0.21)  (0.29)  (0.36) 
Grow rice 0.65 2835 0.69 1753 -0.04*** 
(dummy = 1 if true) (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Owns livestock 0.44 2835 0.45 1753 -0.01 
(dummy = 1 if true) (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Rural 0.85 2835 0.76 1753 0.09*** 
(dummy = 1 if true) (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Country 0.43 2835 0.48 1753 -0.05*** 
(dummy = 1 if Cote d’Ivoire) (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Number of mobile phones 1.11 1973 1.10 1279 0.01 
in households (0.01) 1227 (0.01) 814 (0.01) 
***, ** and * denote respectively significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
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 Empirical analysis 
From the mobile money incentive theory discussed above, it follows that the use of 
mobile money should affect market participation, especially distant and larger markets 
presenting apparent risks of hold-up.  Ideally, a randomized control trial or other experimental 
design would allow us to estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) of mobile money on 
market participation. Since no such dataset is available, we rely on comparative non-
experimental methods to test the hypothesis that mobile money increases distant market 
participation. Specifically, we carry out an empirical analysis using household-level data from a 
cross-sectional survey conducted in Tanzania and Cote d’Ivoire. In this section, we present our 
empirical models with their respective identification assumptions.  
 Basic specification 
We first conduct a reduced-form analysis to specify the relationship between distant 
market participation and mobile money. In this section, distant market participation 𝐷𝑖  by 
household i is measured by a discrete variable taking the value of one for sales in regional and 
local markets and zero for village market or farmgate sales. In the rest of the study, we will adopt 
the term “distant market” to allude to the regional and local markets which are generally 
characterized by higher prices and higher transaction costs associated with higher risks of hold-
up. In the basic specification, farmers are assumed to be net sellers. Following the market 
participation model proposed by Alene et al. (2008), we describe the farmer market participation 
decision as follows: 
𝐷𝑖
∗ = 𝛼𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽𝜃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖       (3) 
𝐷𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑖
∗ > 0  
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𝐷𝑖
∗ is a latent variable function and 𝐷𝑖 a function taking the value of 1 for any positive value of  
𝛼𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽𝜃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 and 0 otherwise. 𝑇𝑖 is a dummy variable indicating whether households receive 
payment from their customers through mobile money, and 𝜃𝑖 is a vector of demographic and 
socio-economic control variables comprising household size, income, land size, age, gender, 
years of education and farming experience of the household head as identified in the market 
participation literature (Alene et al., 2008; Bellemare and Barrett, 2006; Burke et al., 2015; 
Martey et al., 2017).   We also included controls for livestock ownership, access to price 
information via cell phone, rice cultivation dummy for Cote d’Ivoire and Maize cultivation 
dummy for Tanzania as well as a country dummy. 
 Identification 
To identify the causal link between mobile money and market participation, equation (3) 
requires the mobile money covariate to be exogenous. However, as mentioned in Jack and Suri  
(2014), mobile money adoption variables suffer from endogeneity due to selective adoption 
associated with social status or other unobservables. Indeed, one could argue that the use of 
mobile money to complete commercial transactions is simultaneously determined with the 
market participation variable by an underlying entrepreneurship factor. If the same unobserved 
variables impact mobile money use and market participation, any specification using the 
covariate “mobile money for commercial transaction” to identify the causal effect may lead to 
biased estimates. Jack and Suri (2014) and Munyegera and Matsumoto, (2016) use respectively 
the mobile money agent density within a specific radius of the household and the distance as an 
instrument for mobile money use. As the CGAP survey in Cote d’Ivoire and Tanzania does not 
contain any agent density data, we proxy agent density by households access to a mobile money 
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agent within a walking distance from their house.  Then we construct a set of instruments that 
combines phone ownership, frequency of remittances and distance to a mobile money agent.  
The instrument must satisfy two conditions: the exogeneity and the relevance conditions. 
The exogeneity of our instruments hinges on the argument that the set of instruments mainly 
affects market participation through mobile money. In addition to the distance proxy “access to a 
mobile money agent from a walking distance”, we include the phone ownership and frequency of 
mobile money transactions to capture some variation in the mobile money activity in the 
households, given the cross-sectional data. Unlike the household status in terms of mobile money 
use, the frequency of mobile money transactions can be assumed not directly related to market 
participation, since mobile money transfers generally serve for a wide range of purposes 
including coping with financial hardships. One may argue that the frequency of remittances 
influence market participation through improved access to capital. However, the transfer amount 
is more likely to affect access to capital than the frequency of mobile money remittances. 
Moreover, given the seasonality of agriculture operations, agriculture-related remittances may 
not be completed frequently. Then the frequency of mobile money transfers carries some 
information about the frequency of market transactions completed through mobile money. By 
combining phone ownership, access to a mobile money agent and frequency of remittance, we 
put forward the argument that the resulting instrument does affect market participation through 
mobile money transaction incentives. 
Next, we test the quality of the instrument under two criteria. We use the Kleibergen-
Paap rk LM statistic to test for under-identification and the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic to 
detect weak identification of the instrument with a standard 2 stage least square regression. The 
Lagrange Multiplier statistics (24.5) is higher than the Chi-square critical value at the 1% level of 
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significance, leading to reject the null hypothesis of under-identification. The Cragg-Donald 
Wald F statistics is higher than the critical value for a 10% maximal IV relative bias. Then, we 
can expect less than 10% bias of the instrument. Finally, the Hansen J Statistics reveals over-
identification. This is not surprising given the number of instruments that we include in this 
analysis. However, as emphasized by Parente and Silva (2012), over-identification tests can 
barely detect over-identification of the set moment conditions implied by the economic model. 
We rely on the economic rationale described above to assert the validity of our instruments.  
 Binary endogenous regression models 
 Bivariate Probit model 
The dependent variable market participation 𝐷𝑖 and the endogenous covariate mobile 
money 𝑇𝑖 are both binary variables. Common two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation such as 
(2SLS) linear probability model (LPM) or control function approaches such as the ivprobit 
command of stat presents important flaws pointed out in Lewbel et al. (2012), mainly because 
they lead to inconsistent or biased estimates when the endogenous regressor is binary. We first 
employ a recursive bivariate probit model (RBP) in the empirical analysis as in Ma et al. (2018) 
and Bontemps and Nauges (2016). The RBP is a maximum likelihood estimator that permit 
general form of heteroskedasticity. The model consists of equation (3) to which we add a second 
equation (4)  with a latent variable function describing the decision of mobile money use as 
following: 
𝑇𝑖
∗ = 𝛿𝜃𝑖 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖         (4) 
𝑇𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑇𝑖
∗ > 0  
where 𝑍𝑖 is an instrument and  𝜇𝑖 the error term. 𝜃𝑖 is the vector of demographic and socio-
economic variables defined in (3). A required assumption to the estimation of the bivariate probit 
26 
model is that the error terms  (𝜀𝑖, 𝜇𝑖) follow a  bivariate normally distributed (Wooldridge, 
2011). Additionally, the RBP model requires the relationship in (4) to be correctly specified, that 
is 𝑍𝑖 should feature a complete set of instruments. The direct implication of the specification 
assumption is the relevance of the instrument. 
 Special regressor approach 
The bivariate probit model discussed above constitute a valid alternative to the LPM and 
control function approaches but makes strong distributional and functional form assumptions 
(Wooldridge, 2011). The special regressor approach proposed by Dong and Lewbel (2015) 
requires weaker assumptions mainly hinging on the exogeneity of the variable used as special 
regressor. Specifically, the special regressor must be conditionally independent of 𝜀𝑖  and 
distributed with large support. The special regressor resolves the issues raised by likelihood 
estimators such as bivariate probit since it allows for unknown forms of heteroscedasticity and 
consistently estimates the endogenous variable coefficient (Lewbel, revised April 2011). We 
exploit this approach to estimate another model of the relationship between the binary 
endogenous regressor mobile money and the binary dependent variable market participation, as 
in  Bontemps and Nauges (2016) and Ruyssen and Salomone (2018). The model specification is 
a revision of equation (3) to include a new variable 𝑆 called special regressor, as follows: 
𝐷𝑖
∗ = 𝛼𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽𝜃𝑖 + 𝑆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                 (5) 
𝐷𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑖
∗ > 0  
As mentioned above, the special regressor 𝑆 must be unrelated to the covariates in 
equation (3), while expected to affect our outcome market participation. In this study, we exploit 
the 2015 rainfall deviation from 30 years average in the wet season in Cote d’Ivoire and 
Tanzania. To demonstrate the relationship between rainfall deviation and market participation, 
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we put forward the argument that high deviations from rainfall averages rainfall are supply-
shifters that induce high price variability, affecting participation in distant markets. The positive 
relationship between rainfall deviation and market prices is demonstrated in Barrios et al. (2008) 
and Sassi and Cardaci (2013). 
To construct the rainfall deviation variable, we first obtain satellite rainfall data from the 
African Rainfall Climatology, version 2 (ARC2) of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) (Novella and Thiaw, 2012). The dataset contains gridded daily 
precipitation estimates of the African continent from 1983 to 2019. The spatial resolution of 
10km x 10 km (0.1-degree grid) is precise enough to provide rainfall estimates of the geographic 
location of the households included in the survey. We use the Google Maps geocoding API 
(Python) to match the household location to their corresponding precipitation levels based on 
their geographic coordinates. The computed special regressor consists of the 2015 rainfall 
deviation from the 1995 to 2014 average over the wet season in Tanzania and Cote d’Ivoire. 
The rainfall deviation is continuously distributed with large support. Indeed, Lewbel et al. 
(2012) assert that any normally distributed variable should satisfy the condition of common 
support. We expect the rainfall deviation to affect positively prices through resulting lower 
yields. Since higher prices drive market participation up, we expect a positive relationship 
between rainfall deviation and market participation; then the E(D | T, θ,  S) increases with 
rainfall deviation (S). 
 We compute the marginal effects of each covariate in the special regressor model 
following Lewbel and Yang (2012). The marginal effects represent the derivative of the average 
index function 𝑉(𝑋′𝛽 + 𝑆) = 𝐸(𝐷|𝑋′𝛽 + 𝑆), expressed as follows: 
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𝜕𝐸(𝐷|𝑋′𝛽 + 𝑆)
𝜕𝑋
= 𝑣(𝑋′𝛽 + 𝑆)𝛽 
                                                                    (6) 
The estimates of the marginal effects are given by: 
             ?̅??̂? =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑣𝑖?̂?
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
                                                                     (7) 
where 𝑣𝑖 is an estimator of the average index function 𝑣𝑖 as in Lewbel and Yang (2012). 
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 Results and discussion 
We present the estimates of the recursive bivariate probit (RBP) (model 1) and the special 
regressor (SREG) (model 2) models that we compare to the Instrumental Variable Probit 
(IVprobit) (model 3) in Table 2.4. As described above, the main model consists of two 
equations: the market participation equation (3) and the mobile money equation (4). The first two 
models assume a binary mobile money dependent variable  𝑇𝑖 , while in the IVprobit model, 𝑇𝑖 is 
required to be continuous. The RBP and SREG models should provide the most consistent 
estimates since they handle better endogenous binary regressor (Wooldridge, 2011). Table 2.5 
reports the marginal effects of the set of covariates on market participation for the three models. 
The analysis indicates that the variable mobile money is endogenous. In all three models, the 
instrument consists of three variables: mobile phone ownership, presence of a mobile money 
agent within a walking distance from home, and the average monthly frequency of remittances 
over the last three months preceding the survey. In model (2), the special regressor consists of 
the 2015 rainfall deviation from a 30 years’ average over the wet season. The estimation results 
in all three models show a positive and significant effect of mobile money on market 
participation with a higher magnitude of the mobile money coefficient estimate in model (3).  In 
addition, the estimation of the three models consistently reveals a significant relationship 
between the dependent variable market participation and the covariate rainfall deviation and land 
size.  
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Table 2.4 Estimates of the three models, main specifications (Standard errors in 
Parentheses) 
Dependent variable: 
Market participation 
   
 
Bivariate probit Special regressor IV probit 
Mobile money 1.255 *** 1.168 ** 0.454 *** 
 
(0.449) 
 
(0.461) 
 
(0.152) 
 
Rainfall deviation 0.246 ** 
  
0.089 ** 
 
(0.113) 
   
(0.041) 
 
Household size 0.028 *** 0.000 
 
0.010 *** 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.004) 
 
Male 0.083 
 
0.018 
 
0.030 
 
 
(0.061) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.022) 
 
Age -0.007 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.002 
 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.004) 
 
Age squared 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
Land size -0.002 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
Rural -0.262 *** -0.037 
 
-0.095 *** 
 
(0.068) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.025) 
 
Tanzania 0.053 
 
-0.163 *** 0.019 
 
 
(0.066) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.024) 
 
N 2041  1939  2041  
Log-likelihood -1800.53    -1343.80  
*, **, ** denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
 Bivariate Probit 
To determine whether the mobile money variable is endogenous, we first estimate a 
seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model (SUBP) by excluding mobile money from the market 
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participation equation following Ma et al (2017) and Thuo et al (2014). If mobile money is 
correlated with market participation through unobserved heterogeneity, we will conclude that 
mobile money is endogenous. The LR test of the hypothesis 𝜎 = 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟( 𝜇𝑖
′, 𝜀𝑖) = 0 yields a chi-
square statistics of 10.53, higher than critical chi-square (1 degree of freedom at the 5% 
significance level). In both models (SUBP and RBP), we reject the null hypothesis of zero 
correlation and conclude that the mobile money variable is endogenous. This justifies the use of 
the RBP model to estimate the effect of mobile money on market participation.  
Next, we assess the goodness-of-fit of the RBP model and the joint normal distribution of 
the error terms using respectively the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit (Hosmer and 
Lemesbow, 1980) and the Murphy score (Murphy, 2007) tests proposed by (Chiburis, 2011). The 
chi-square statistics of the Hosmer-Lemeshow test is 20.22, higher than critical chi-square (21 
degree of freedom at the 5% significance level). We fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
misspecification on the Hosmer-Lemeshow, implying that the model is correctly specified. Yet, 
the null hypothesis of joint normal distribution of the error terms is rejected at the 5% level. This 
suggests bias in the parameter estimates due to notable skewness and Kurtosis. 
The estimated marginal effects of the RBP (Left panel of Table 2.5) show that using 
mobile money increases the likelihood of market participation by 45 percentage points on 
average. This result is consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model. The RBP model 
yields a mobile money estimate of more than five folds lower than the estimate of the IV probit 
model. This is not surprising since the IV probit assumes a linear mobile money equation. As a 
result, we may observe values of the mobile money estimates out of the range (0, 1) in the IV 
probit model. These discrepancies between IV probit and binary endogenous covariate 
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estimation methods such as RBP and Special regressor are stressed in Dong and Lewbel (2015) 
and Bontemps and Nauges (2016).   
Table 2.5 Estimated marginal effects (Standard errors in Parentheses) 
Dependent variable: 
Market participation    
   
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)  
 
Bivariate 
probit 
Special 
regressor 
IV probit  OLS 
 
          
Mobile money 0.4537 *** 0.5513 ** 2.6086 ***  0.1556 *** 
 (0.1522)  (0.2530)  (0.5945)   (0.0434)  
Rainfall deviation 0.0890 ** 0.5121 *** 0.2324 **  0.0889 ** 
 (0.0408)  (0.0920)  (0.1081)   (0.0432)  
Household size 0.0103 *** 0.0025  0.0239 **  0.0108 *** 
 (0.0037)  (0.0032)  (0.0102)   (0.0039)  
Male 0.0300  -0.0042  0.0536   0.0352  
 (0.0221)  (0.0208)  (0.0597)   (0.0229)  
Age -0.0024  -0.0030  -0.0094   -0.0019  
 (0.004)  (0.0034)  (0.0104)   (0.0041)  
Age squared 0.0000  0.0000  0.0001   0.0000  
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0001)   (0.0000)  
Land size -0.0007 *** -0.0004 ** -0.0017 ***  -0.0007 *** 
 (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0005)   (0.0002)  
Rural -0.0945 *** 0.0022  -0.1665 **  -0.1141 *** 
 (0.0249)  (0.0258)  (0.0809)   (0.0246)  
Tanzania 0.0190  -0.0827 *** -0.0066   0.0320  
 (0.0241)  (0.0237)  (0.0676)   (0.0244)  
N 2041  1843  2,041   2041  
*, **, ** denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
 
Other significant variables include deviation from rainfall average, household size, land 
size and location in a rural area. The variables all have the correct signs. A positive or negative 
deviation from rainfall average may lower crop yields and affect the supply of products on crop 
markets. As a result, we should expect prices to increase and markets to attract more farmers. As 
in Martey et al. (2017), larger households are found to participate more in distant markets than 
their smaller counterparts. Specifically, an additional household member increased the 
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probability of market participation by 1 percentage point. The two negative coefficients are 
respectively “land size” and “rural”.   The negative sign of land size in models (1) and (3) may 
appear counterintuitive since we expect large landowners to participate more in distant markets 
to sell their marketable surplus. However, we should not ignore that larger lands mostly host 
cash crops wholesaled to agribusiness firms and/or cooperatives, including export crops such as 
cocoa and coffee in Cote d’Ivoire and cotton and coffee in Tanzania. The spot markets alluded to 
in this study are known to host transactions involving smaller quantities of products. Hence it is 
not uncommon to expect land constrained farmers to participate more in spot market 
transactions. Finally, as expected, farmers living in rural areas are less likely to participate in 
distant markets, consistent with findings in Burke et al. (2015).  
 
 Special Regressor 
In using the special regressor approach, we first construct the variable identified as 
special regressor. This variable consists of the rainfall deviation from 30 years average as in 
(Amare et al., 2018). It satisfies the requirements of continuous distribution with large support, 
then can be assumed exogenous. The Breusch-Pagan test of heteroscedasticity on the regression 
of S on the other covariates reveals the presence of heteroscedasticity. The null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity is rejected the 1% level of significance. We thus allow an unknown form of 
heteroscedasticity in our model. We use a kernel density estimator of the residuals density 
function in the first step of the special regressor estimation, with a standard Epanechnikov kernel 
function. A 95% trimming is applied to the sample as in Bontemps and Nauges (2016). Panel 2 
of Table 2.5 presents the estimated marginal effects of the special regressor model, computed as 
described above.  
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Farmers using mobile money are more likely to participate in distant markets by a 55 
percentage point. The special regressor provides a slightly larger estimate of the marginal effect 
of mobile money relative to the RBP. In both models, the magnitude of this effect ranges 
between 0 and 1, as opposed to 2.6 with the IVprobit estimation. The larger magnitude of mobile 
money estimate relative to the other covariates in all three models leads us to acknowledge the 
critical role that mobile money can play in market participation decisions. Previous studies have 
found a positive effect of mobile money on welfare (Munyegera and Matsumoto, 2016) without 
necessarily testing the mechanism through which mobile money affects welfare. An exception is 
found in (Jack and Suri, 2014). The results of our study not only confirm this positive effect on 
welfare but also sheds light on one of the potential channels through which mobile money can 
affect welfare. 
The rainfall deviation variable is positive and statistically significant in the three 
specifications, despite a higher magnitude in the special regressor model. The rainfall deviation 
estimate shows a positive price effect on market participation, comparable to the mobile money 
effect in the special regressor estimation. The remaining covariates affect market participation to 
a lesser extent than mobile money and rainfall deviations. For example, the land size had a 
significant but small effect on market participation. From the special regressor model estimates, 
it appears that Tanzanian farmers are less likely to participate in distant markets than their 
Ivorian counterparts.  
 Levels of market participation 
In line with the theoretical model, we expand the analysis to investigate whether the 
mechanisms provided by mobile money leads farmers to participate in markets carrying the 
higher risks of hold-up. It is well accepted that the threat of hold up increases with the distance 
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or the size of the market (Figure 1). First, we rank 4 markets by the importance of the hold-up 
threat: farm gate (1), village (2), local market (3) and regional market (4). Farm-gate represents 
the venue with the lowest threat of hold-up since farmers incur fewer transaction costs as defined 
in the theoretical model section. The threats of hold-up are the most prominent on the regional 
markets given the higher transaction costs (transportation, negotiation, enforcement) that each 
farmer must incur to successfully complete a transaction. 
 The ordered nature of the new dependent variable market participation (1-4) requires an 
ordinal model to estimate the effect of mobile money and other control variables. We use an 
ordered probit model with the same control variables as in equation (4). Due to the dataset 
limitations and computational issues, we do not use an instrument for mobile money in the 
ordered probit specification but rather the use of mobile money to receive payment from 
customers (T). We acknowledge the potential endogeneity that may bias the estimates but we are 
mainly interested in a comparison of mobile money estimates across market levels rather than the 
magnitude of the estimate per se. The results of the analysis show that market participation 
increases with the importance of the threat for mobile money users (Table 2.6), which leads to 
conclude that the mobile money may play a critical role in alleviating the uncertainty around the 
transaction on distant, more important markets. 
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Table 2.6 Marginal effects of the ordered probit model at means 
Market 
Mobile 
Money = 0 
(SE) Mobile 
money = 1 
(SE) Change   
On farm or to traveling merchant 0.11*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.02) -0.04**   
At village 0.44*** (0.01) 0.38*** (0.08) -0.05**   
At local market 0.40*** (0.01) 0.48*** (0.03) 0.08**   
At regional market 0.04*** (0.01) 0.07* (0.01) 0.02**   
***, ** and * denote respectively significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
We conduct additional robustness checks using alternative model specifications and additional 
control variables. The results are consistent across specifications (Appendix A).  
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 Conclusion 
Since the mobile money revolution in Kenya, there is an increasing interest in 
understanding its potential effects on vulnerable communities in developing countries. If a 
growing body of work points out the role played by digital payments in improving various 
dimensions of welfare, the mechanism through which mobile may impact welfare has received 
scant attention from the empirical literature. As a result, most studies consider the remittance 
pathway as the most plausible mechanism through which mobile money may impact welfare. 
We develop and test a conceptual model based on a transaction costs economics 
framework to explain how digital payments improve market participation. Our empirical 
approach consists of the special regressor method that efficiently addresses the endogeneity of 
the binary variable of interest – that is, mobile money. We find that the probability of distant 
market participation is increased on average by 55 percentage points for mobile money users. 
Furthermore, we rank marketing venues based on hold-up risk and find that the effect of mobile 
money is the most prominent on decisions to switch from village to local market. Our study adds 
to the literature by establishing support for the existence of a third pathway through which 
mobile money may impact welfare and market participation. To date, this is the first study to 
utilize a transaction cost economic framework to explain the positive welfare effect of mobile 
money. 
The results of the analysis conducted on Cote d’Ivoire and Tanzania data indicated 
demonstrate how farm and non-farm enterprise owners would benefit from the spread and 
accessibility to digital payments beyond the traditional pathway of credit, savings, and 
remittances. By cutting down the substantial transaction costs that preclude market participation, 
digital payments offer an innovative solution for addressing market failures due to high 
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transaction costs. In addition, the large scale adoption of the technology which is demand-driven, 
unlike numerous interventions in rural areas, suggests sustainable impacts.  
If the findings of the study hold for Cote d’Ivoire and Tanzania, a number of factors 
should be considered when generalizing the implications to a wider sample of Sub-Saharan 
African countries. Differences in literacy, fiscal policy, cell-phone ownership and other factors 
that affect the use of mobile money may also affect the extent to which mobile money addresses 
market failures. One other caveat to the optimistic conclusion of the results is that our sample 
includes only a limited number of mobile money users (less than 10%). Moreover the dataset 
includes few details about the transaction. Our variable of interest does not distinguish users that 
receive payment for sale of agricultural products from users that are paid for services or products 
from non-farm enterprises. This has important implications on the set of possible market choices 
by the surveyed households. 
Although mobile money may affect market participation in general, the effect of mobile 
money on the quantity of product sold is unknown. Moreover, our results provide no insight into 
the welfare gain attributed to the transaction costs pathway of mobile money. This research 
points out a need for quantifying the gains in revenues for different types of transactions and 
household categories. This seems a fertile area for further research. 
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Chapter 3 - Mobile money and household resilience: A development 
resilience approach 
 Introduction 
Poor and resource-constrained rural households in developing countries are particularly 
vulnerable to the negative effects of income shocks associated with natural hazards, disease, 
unexpected social hardships, and price volatility in input and output markets. Negative income 
shocks exacerbate the risk of food insecurity already prominent in most rural communities of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, whose livelihood depends primarily on agriculture. It is therefore critical for 
vulnerable households to adopt efficient risk management strategies. In developed countries, 
farmers have access to credit, insurance and other services that protect them against most shocks. 
Unfortunately, inexistent or poor access to insurance in developing countries force rural 
households to underinvest in risk management strategies that would provide access to or sustain 
food security during periods of hardship (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007). Instead, they tend to rely on 
livelihood threatening strategies such as selling productive assets to offset consumption shortfalls 
when facing a negative shock (Fafchamps et al., 1998). While such a strategy may provide short-
term relief in times of hardship, it clearly diminishes households’ capacity to cope with future 
shocks. Consequently, policymakers and development communities are in a continuous search 
for mechanisms designed to enhance the resilience of smallholder agricultural producers in 
developing countries. 
 There is empirical evidence that social networks could offer an alternative to formal 
insurance markets (citations). Studies indicate that numerous rural communities in Africa utilize 
a system of informal insurance based on loan exchange. Udry (1990) and Weerdt and Dercon 
(2006) have illustrated the positive effects of informal insurance networks in Africa. 
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Nonetheless, rural households remain vulnerable to shocks because social networks are limited 
in size and magnitude of exchanges. It has been shown that the size of a social network decreases 
with the cost of establishing and coordinating relationships while the magnitude of exchanges 
falls with monitoring and enforcement costs (Murgai et al., 2002). These two categories of 
transaction costs may increase in magnitude with the distance between members of a social 
network since remoteness increases the risks associated with the coordination and enforcement 
of informal contracts. This risk is also exacerbated by the high cost of money transfers between 
distant members of a social network. Traditional money transfer methods at the local scale 
include physical transfer in person, using a bus driver or a money transfer service such as 
Western Union (Economides and Jeziorski, 2017), all of which entail high costs. 
Recent large-scale adoption of mobile technologies has unleashed new perspectives of 
cheaper money transactions for rural households receiving remittances. One of these 
technologies, mobile money was introduced in Kenya in 2007 by Safaricom (M-PESA) and was 
widely adopted since. In addition to being faster than traditional remote money transaction 
methods, mobile money entails a significantly lower cost of sending and receiving money. The 
positive effect of mobile money on consumption smoothing is demonstrated in Kenya (Jack and 
Suri, 2014) and Uganda (Munyegera and Matsumoto, 2016). However, there is little evidence of 
potential effect of mobile money on long-run food security and resilience. Most of the studies in 
the literature to date that have investigated the relationship between mobile money and welfare 
rely on static measures of welfare. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of improved risk-sharing through 
mobile money on farmers’ resilience, using alternative measures of resilience. Improved ability 
of the households to withstand and recover from unexpected income shocks is likely to result in 
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long-term positive effects. While Jack and Suri (2014) establish a solid case on the direct effect 
of mobile money on consumption, it is without surprise that this pioneering study found no effect 
of mobile money on wealth when measuring the outcome of interest on the basis of a static 
monetary value of assets. In this study, we use a forward-looking approach grounded on the 
development resilience to investigate the impact of mobile money on resilience. 
 Development resilience 
The word “Resilience” derives from the Latin term resilire, meaning "to jump back" or 
"to recoil" (Fan et al., 2014). In the development arena, the concept of “resilience” is perceived 
as a normative goal toward which policymakers, non-profit organizations, and researchers 
develop their projects. Although no clear consensus exists around the definition of resilience, this 
concept is usually perceived as the ability to deal with adverse changes and shocks (Béné et al., 
2012). The growing interest in this concept stems from its holistic framework that allows 
researchers and anti-poverty programs to understand the relationship between a myriad of 
stressors faced by the poor and key well-being indicators. Particularly, resilience integrates three 
key notions: the well-being dynamics, the critical role of risk, and the connection between 
economic, social and environmental factors that affect peoples’ lives (Barrett and Headey, 2014). 
Economic variables are made of global market forces rendering prices volatile and impeding 
access to food, while environmental factors include natural disasters and climate change-related 
risks and social threats to resilience consist of conflicts and social instability. Resilience is 
attractive as a framework. Yet its measurement presents multiple challenges related to the 
complexity and dynamics that characterize well-being in populations facing shocks 
(Knippenberg et al., 2019).  
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In an attempt to reconcile definition and measurement, Barrett and Constas (2014) develop the 
concept of “development resilience” that recognizes and emphasizes three features: individual-
level well-being measurement that can also be aggregated, indicator that integrates the effect of 
stressors and risks, and measurement that accounts for wellbeing dynamic path. Barrett and 
Constas (2014) conceptualize development resilience as “the capacity over time of a person, 
household or other aggregate unit to avoid poverty in the face of various stressors and in the 
wake of myriad shocks”. As a result, a household is qualified as resilient if its capacity to avoid 
poverty “remains high over time”. 
The measurement of development resilience proposed by Barrett and Constas (2014) is 
based on a stochastic well-being outcome, W , that represents the state of an individual or a 
community.  The dynamic well-being of the individual of interest is described by a set of 
moment functions 𝑚𝑘(𝑊𝑡+𝑠|𝑊𝑡, 𝜀𝑡), where 𝑚
𝑘 denotes the 𝑘𝑡ℎ moment, notably the mean (𝑘 =
1), the variance (𝑘 = 2), or the skewness (𝑘 = 3). Specifically, 𝑚𝑘 is a conditional moment 
describing the well-being state 𝑊𝑡+𝑠 in period 𝑡 + 𝑠 conditional on the well-being state in period 
𝑡.  The set of conditional moments characterizes the distribution of possible well-being states of 
the individual or community. The development resilience approach has led to an emerging body 
of literature on targeting or impact evaluation methodology in vulnerable community settings 
(Cissé and Barrett, 2018; Knippenberg et al., 2019; Phadera et al., 2019). One interesting feature 
of this approach is to allow for nonlinear well-being path dynamics, consistent with the theory of 
poverty traps. In fact, the Barret and Constas (BC) approach is derived from the poverty traps 
literature. 
In the context of poor households, one assumption made to test the existence of poverty traps, 
particularly asset-based poverty traps, is poor households’ exclusion from credit markets (Barrett 
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and Carter, 2013). In such conditions, households below the Micawber threshold – the level of 
asset under which a household finds no longer attractive or feasible to pursue an asset 
accumulation strategy (Zimmerman and Carter, 2003) - are trapped into poverty. However, if this 
binding credit constraint is relaxed by digital payments that improve the financial inclusion of 
poor households, there are reasons to think that these technologies can contribute to building 
resilience. Relying solely on a first moment outcome would not allow us to capture the dynamics 
induced by the improved access to credit markets, especially an outcome that results from an 
asset accumulation strategy. The development resilience approach that allows various shocks and 
stressors to impact resilience is suited to evaluate the impact of shocks on long-run well-being 
outcomes (Phadera et al., 2019).   
 Theoretical model 
Theoretical foundations on consumption smoothing 
To derive the testable hypotheses, we start by laying out Deaton (1991)’s canonical 
model of optimal intertemporal consumption behavior (Carter and Lybbert, 2012). In this model, 
an individual that is rationed out of credit markets, and receives a stochastic income stream 
maximizes the utility function: 
max
{𝑐,𝐴}
{∑ (
1
1 + 𝛿
)
𝑡
𝑣(𝑐𝑡)
∞
𝑡=0
}                                                                                                                    (8) 
subject to: 
𝑥𝑡(𝜃, 𝐴) = 𝐺(𝜃𝑡) + (1 + 𝑟)𝐴𝑡         (9) 
𝑐𝑡  ≤ 𝑥𝑡    ∀𝑡                      (10) 
𝐴𝑡+1 = 𝑥𝑡−𝑐𝑡                      (11) 
𝐴𝑡+1 ≥ 0           (12) 
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where 𝑐𝑡 is the consumption in period 𝑡  and 𝐴𝑡 is the individual’s current productive asset stock. 
The labor income 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐺(𝜃𝑡) earned by the individual and the return on productive assets at the 
rate 𝑟 yield 𝑥𝑡, defined as cash-on-hand in the first constraint (9). The labor income 𝐺(𝜃𝑡) is a 
function of the random variable 𝜃𝑡. Constraints (10) guarantees that consumption in period t does 
not exceed the value of cash-on-hand. In constraint (11), the remaining value of cash-on-hands 
after consumption in period 𝑡 is carried out in the next period (𝑡 + 1) as asset stock. The non-
negativity constraint (12) ensures that the borrowing constraint is satisfied. Deaton (1991) 
assumes in his model that labor is inelastically supplied. 
 For an impatient individual that values more current consumption than future returns to 
assets,  𝛿 > 𝑟. The optimality condition requires that consumption in periods 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1 
satisfies the Bellman equation: 
𝑣′(𝑐𝑡) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑣
′(𝑥𝑡), 𝛽𝐸𝑡[𝑣
′(𝑐𝑡+1)]}                                                                                                (13) 
where: 
𝛽 =
1 + 𝛿
1 + 𝑟
> 1                                                                                                                                          (14) 
Deaton’s model can be used to describe the choices of a borrowing-constrained individual facing 
an income shock under two scenarios. 
Scenario 1:  
𝑣′(𝑥𝑡) <  𝛽𝐸𝑡[𝑣
′(𝑐𝑡+1)]                                                                                                                         (15) 
When the discounted expected marginal utility next period exceeds the marginal utility of current 
consumption 𝑥𝑡, the individual facing independent and identically distributed (iid) shocks will 
pursue a consumption smoothing strategy that consists of selling units of assets 𝐴𝑡. 
Scenario 2:  
𝑣′(𝑥𝑡) >  𝛽𝐸𝑡[𝑣
′(𝑐𝑡+1)]                                                                                                                          (16) 
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This scenario is more likely to occur when cash-on-hands drops to the point where the marginal 
utility of consumption is lower than the marginal utility of assets. Deaton’s model predicts a 
reduction in consumption but also in cash on hands in the long run.  
Under both scenarios, a consumption smoothing strategy is pursued at least to some 
extent in the long run. Now let’s assume that the individual facing a random shock is a mobile 
money user and that the anticipated reduced consumption after shock is 𝜔, with 𝜔𝑡 <  𝑐𝑡 .  As a 
result, the individual reduces his cash-on-hands by 𝜆 (𝜆 > 0) which implies a reduction of the 
asset stock 𝐴𝑡 for a sufficiently severe shock. Risk-sharing through mobile money could restore 
consumption to a level above 𝜔𝑡 as demonstrated by Jack and Suri (2014)’s following model of 
risk-sharing. 
Risk Sharing model 
In the risk-sharing model, we consider two additional individuals who share a mutual 
insurance network with the consumer in (10).  The three individuals 𝑖 ∈ {1, 2, 3} are assumed 
identical, earning each 𝑦𝑖𝑡 in period 𝑡. As a starting point, let’s consider the case of no-cost 
transfer. Assuming risk-averse individuals and income variability as the only source of 
uncertainty, the utility maximization problem of individual 𝑖 required by a Pareto efficient 
consumption plan across states can be described as following: 
max
𝑐1𝑡,𝑐2𝑡,𝑐3𝑡
∑ 𝑢(𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝑖
)                                                                                                                                     (17) 
subject to: 
 ∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 1𝑖  for each t.                (18) 
Money transfer at no cost 
When total income in each period is shared equally, the optimal allocation of 
consumption is characterized by two money transfers in any possible direction. Either one 
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individual receives a money transfer from the two other individuals or one individual transfers 
money to the two others. The resulting ex-post welfare at no cost transfer is depicted in Figure 1 
(Panel A) and expressed as follows: 
𝜋∗ = 3𝑢 (
1
3
)                                                                                                                                              (19) 
Money transfer at cost 𝜏 
Transaction costs are inherent to any method of money transfer including through formal 
institution or informal carrier. When a fixed cost 𝜏 is applied to each transaction among 
respective pairs of individuals, with 𝜏 > 0, the solution to the utility maximization problem leads 
to three alternative levels of ex-post welfare: 
𝜋 ∈ {∑ 𝑢(𝑦𝑖),
3
𝑖=1
 𝑢(𝑦1) + 2𝑢 (
1 − 𝑦1 − 𝑘
2
) , 3𝑢 (
1 − 2𝑘
3
)}                                                             (20) 
The first welfare level 𝐴0 = ∑ 𝑢(𝑦𝑖) 
3
𝑖=1  characterizes a scenario of no transfer realization, while 
𝐴1 = 𝑢(𝑦1) + 2𝑢 (
1−𝑦1−𝑘
2
) describes the ex-post welfare associated with one transfer from any 
of the individual to another, and the welfare level 𝐴2 = 3𝑢 (
1−2𝑘
3
) is reached with two transfers 
occurring between any pair of individuals and the third one. The areas of the simplex in Figure 
3.1 (Panel B) correspond to each level of ex-post welfare. With the transfer cost 𝜏, decisions to 
transfer money are constrained by the magnitude of 𝜏. Income differentials should, therefore, be 
large enough to allow any transfer, which increases the occurrence of 𝐴0 and 𝐴1.   
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Figure 3.1 Ex-post welfare 
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The reduction in the cost of transferring money 𝜏 shrinks the areas 𝐴0 and 𝐴1 and 
increases the occurrences of a two-transfers scenario (𝐴2). It follows from the model above that 
each individual of the network is better off with a reduced cost of risk-sharing. A low-cost 
money transfer service such as Mobile Money is likely to increase the number of active network 
participants and the number of transactions in the network. The direct implication for consumer i 
is to reach a new consumption level q above anticipated reduced consumption 𝜔𝑡 after the shock 
(𝑞𝑡 >  𝜔𝑡). Because the marginal utility is assumed monotonically decreasing, 𝛽𝐸𝑡[𝑣
′(𝑞)] <
 𝛽𝐸𝑡[𝑣
′(𝜔)]. As a result, the intensity of asset depletion ∆𝑥 required to raise the marginal utility 
of cash-on-hands to 𝛽𝐸𝑡[𝑣
′(𝑞)] is lower than the level of asset depletion ∆𝑥′ necessary to reach 
𝛽𝐸𝑡[𝑣
′(𝜔)] under scenario 1 in (15).  Scenario 2 yields the same prediction as scenario 1 for a 
shock sufficiently strong to raise 𝛽𝐸𝑡[𝑐
′(𝑞)] above the marginal utility of assets. 
 Alternative coping strategies 
Consumption smoothing is not the only risk coping mechanism adopted by rural 
households. Empirical evidence suggests that poor households alternatively adopt asset 
smoothing strategies (Fafchamps et al., 1998; Kazianga and Udry, 2006; Verpoorten, 2009). One 
limitation of Deaton’s model is to not fully account for such alternatives. In this vein, Carter and 
Lybbert (2012) demonstrate the coexistence of consumption and asset accumulation strategies by 
describing and empirically testing a poverty trap model. However, this should not alter the 
prediction of the theoretical model in the context of the study. We mainly focus on shocks 
described as intense by the surveyed households. These shocks are more likely to draw 
borrowing-constrained households to lower their asset holdings even under an asset smoothing 
regime.  
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From the theoretical model above, it follows that risk-sharing through mobile money 
improves household resilience to intense negative shocks through an increased number of 
network participants and transactions. 
 
 Empirical investigation 
 Identification 
A credible methodological approach to evaluating the impact of mobile money adoption 
on household resilience would require a valid counterfactual, that is a comparison group that 
resembles the mobile money users in observable and unobservable characteristics, with the 
deviating factor being the use of mobile money. One could arguably refute that Kenyan 
households randomly adopt the mobile payment technology, leading to a self-selection issue. 
Additional socioeconomic variables including income could affect mobile money adoption 
decisions, such variables having a non-stochastic relationship with our outcome of interest. Our 
identification approach hinges on the use of the distance to the nearest mobile money agent as an 
instrument for mobile money use to address the potential self-selection issue. Technically, the 
approach will allow us to estimate the effect of mobile money on resilience based on the 
assumption that improved access to mobile money leads to increased use of the service. This is a 
reasonable assumption since the correlation test show a relative strong negative correlation 
between distance to the nearest mobile money agent and mobile money use. 
One criticism of the use of the distance as a proxy for mobile money access stems from 
the potential non-randomness in the mobile money agent roll-out in Kenya. If the mobile money 
agent distribution network is uncorrelated to the household characteristics over the period 
running from the lunch of M-PESA in Kenya (2008) to the second survey round (2009) (Jack 
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and Suri, 2014), we could hardly make the case that any further agent network development plan 
is irrelevant to the households’ income level or other socio-demographic variables. Agent 
networks may expand faster in wealthier neighborhoods. However, mobile money retailing may 
equally flourish in poorer neighborhoods, where households are more prone to receive 
remittances from their distant relatives or acquaintances. Figure 2 maps the relationship between 
distance to the nearest agent and asset ownership over the 4 rounds of the survey. The plot shows 
no apparent relationship between the agent distribution network and household well-being levels, 
though a large proportion of surveyed households are within 5 km of an agent location. 
  
    
    
Figure 3.2 Distance to the nearest mobile money agent by levels of asset holding 
 
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
D
is
ta
n
c
e
0 2 4 6
Asset holdings
54 
To confirm the stochastic relationship between distance to the nearest agent and wealth, 
we perform a mean difference comparison. P-values are respectively 0.9542, 0.3547, 0.4116 and 
0.9848 for survey rounds 1, 2, 3 and 5, supporting the claim that the agent positioning is 
irrelevant to the population level of wealth. 
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 Construction of the asset-based well-being index 
The outcome variable consists of a measure of resilience based on productive asset 
ownership. The main challenge to estimating an asset-based measure of well-being in dynamic 
settings is the dimensionality problem as stressed by Barrett and Carter (2013).  Because 
households own a portfolio of multiple assets, comparing well-being across heterogeneous 
households becomes problematic. As a result, the majority of studies that deal with dynamic 
asset-based measures of well-being are conducted in pastoralist settings where household 
livelihoods heavily depend on livestock holdings (Cissé and Barrett, 2018; Lybbert et al., 2004; 
Phadera et al., 2019). Our study population consists of households from all regions of Kenya, 
which implies a diversity of livelihood strategies and productive asset portfolios among surveyed 
households. Thus, the construction of a valid multi-asset index is critical to address the 
dimensionality problem and properly capture the effect of the variable of interest. 
We construct a Livelihood-Weighted Asset Index (LWAI) as in Adato et al. (2006), 
where the asset index 𝐿𝑊𝐴𝐼(𝐴𝑖𝑡) is a one-dimension measure of the asset bundle 𝐴𝑖𝑡. Assets are 
weighted by their marginal contribution to livelihood. The main advantage of the 𝐿𝑊𝐴𝐼 over the 
other resilience metrics is that the weights can be estimated flexibly, accounting for the 
interactions across returns to assets. Unlike factor and principal component analysis, the 𝐿𝑊𝐴𝐼 
provides a convenient livelihood metric expressed in poverty lines units. Household totalizing a 
one-unit LWAI own an asset portfolio that predicts a livelihood at the poverty line. 
The construction of the livelihood-weighted asset index involves two steps. First, the weights are 
estimated by a regression of the livelihood of household 𝑖 (𝑙𝑖𝑡) on the vector of assets 𝐴𝑖𝑡: 
𝑙𝑖𝑡 =  ∑ 𝜑𝑗(𝐴𝑖𝑡)𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑗
                                                                                                              (21) 
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where  𝜑𝑗(𝐴𝑖𝑡) is the weight of asset 𝑗 and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 the error term. The subscripts i, j and t are 
respectively used for household (i), asset (j) and time period (t). A quadratic term is included in 
(21) to account for non-linearity in return to assets. The livelihood measure 𝑙𝑖𝑡  is the ratio of the 
household expenditures to the poverty line. Household expenditures are computed from the 
survey data while the monthly adult equivalent poverty line is obtained from the 2006 and 2015 
Kenya Household Surveys. The poverty line is a per capita minimum income that categorizes 
households as non-poor in Kenya. We scale the poverty line to account for the household size 
and composition using the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
scale S (Bittman and Goodin, 2000):  
 𝑆 =  (1 +  0.7 × ([𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠] −  1) +  0.5 × [𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛])            (22) 
Children include household members aged 15 and below. 
The estimates of assets weights ?̂?𝑗 obtained in (21) are used to calculate the livelihood-weighted 
asset index: 
𝐿𝑊𝐴𝐼(𝐴𝑖𝑡) = ∑ ?̂?𝑗(𝐴𝑖𝑡)𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑗
                                                                                                            (23) 
The assets consist of 3 categories: natural capital (land), human capital and productive capital 
(equipment). To reduce the number of items included in the latter category, they are aggregated 
in five sub-categories: non-motorized mobility, vehicles, farm machinery and equipment, 
building and improvement (Table 3.1) and livestock inventory expressed as tropical livestock 
units (TLU) with: 1 TLU = 1 cow = 0.7 camel = 10 sheep or goats. 
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Table 3.1 Sub-categories of productive capital 
Sub-Category Non-motorized 
mobility 
Vehicles and 
motorized  
Farm 
machinery and 
equipment 
Building and 
improvement 
Items Bicycle 
Wheelbarrow 
Carts 
Tuktuk 
Car 
Truck 
Tractors 
Motorcycle 
Power saw 
Chaff cutter 
Sprayer 
Sheller 
Grinder 
Grazing unit 
Feeding units 
Poultry 
Irrigation 
equipment 
Ploughs 
Cattle dip 
Stores 
 
Equation (21) is estimated by a year and district fixed effect panel and results are reported in 
Table 3.5. 
 Econometric model 
From the theoretical results, it follows that households using mobile money could receive 
support from a wider network when facing income shocks and exhibit more resilience than their 
non-users counterpart.  To test this relationship, we construct a resilience score based on the 
econometric method proposed by Cissé and Barrett (2018) that we regress on the distance to the 
nearest mobile money agent and control variables using a four rounds panel. The model consists 
of three equations estimated consecutively. First, we regress the LWAI measure (𝑊𝑖𝑡) obtained 
in (23) on a polynomial function of the lagged LWAI (𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1)  and other covariates assuming a 
first order Markov process: 
𝑊𝑖𝑡 =  ∑ 𝛽𝑀𝑘𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
+ 𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝜔𝑀𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑀𝑖𝑡                                                                           (24) 
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As pointed out by Cissé and Barrett (2018), only one lag is necessary to summarize 
previous states of well-being. Another benefit to controlling for a single lag period is to avoid or 
mitigate multicollinearity from including two left-hand side variables which dependence is non-
stochastic for obvious reasons. The polynomial lagged asset included in (24) accounts for the 
nonlinear expected well-being dynamics (Barrett and Constas, 2014). A polynomial of order 3 is 
preferred to mirror the S-Shaped dynamic nonlinear path. In fact, a cubic specification is the 
most parsimonious specification to accounts for the S-Shape. The variable of interest 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑡  
consists of the distance to the nearest mobile money retailer expressed in kilometers. We control 
for household characteristics 𝑋𝑖𝑡 as in Jack and Suri (2014), notably the household head’s 
gender, age, education and main source of income. Household size and rural or urban residency 
complete the set of control variables and  𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error term. 
Assuming that the mean random error term of (24) is zero, we can estimate the predicted 
mean LWAI as follows (Just and Pope, 1979): 
?̂?𝑖𝑡 =  ∑ ?̂?𝑀𝑘𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
+ ?̂?𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  ?̂?𝑀𝑋𝑖𝑡                                                                                     (25) 
The conditional variance is obtained by squaring the residuals of (24) and expressed as the 
following conditional variance equation: 
𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 = ∑ 𝛽𝑉𝑘𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
+ 𝛼𝑉𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝜔𝑉𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑉𝑖𝑡                                                                               (26)  
Note that the indices M and V on the coefficient in (24), (25) and (26) refer to the mean and 
variance equation coefficients. As in (25), we assume that the random error terms of (26) have a 
zero-mean and estimate the following conditional variance: 
?̂?𝑖𝑡
2 =  ∑ ?̂?𝑉𝑘𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
+ ?̂?𝑉𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑡 + ?̂?𝑉𝑋𝑖𝑡                                                                                        (27) 
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The estimates of the mean ?̂?𝑖𝑡 and the variance ?̂?𝑖𝑡
2  LWAI can be used to estimate each 
household probability density function (pdf) over each round of the survey, assuming the two 
predicted conditional moment are normally, log-normally or gamma-distributed. The kernel 
density plots of ?̂?𝑖𝑡 and ?̂?𝑖𝑡
2  are presented in Appendix B. Using the pdf of each household, we 
construct the development resilience score, that is the probability to exceed a threshold level ?̅? 
of assets holding (LWAI): Pr (𝑊𝑖𝑡 > ?̅?). The resilience score is regressed on the same set of 
covariates as in (17) and (19): 
𝜌𝑖𝑡
2 = ∑ 𝛽𝑅𝑘𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
+ 𝛼𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝜔𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑅𝑖𝑡                                                                              (28)  
If mobile money is predicted to increase resilience to shocks, households residing near to 
a mobile money agent should exhibit a higher resilience to shocks than their counterparts living 
further from any mobile money retailer, ceteris paribus. Since the instrument for mobile money 
is the distance between household and mobile money retailer, the regression should yield a 
negative estimate of the mobile money coefficient in the mean (24) and the resilience (28) 
equations. As to the variance equation, the relationship between distance to a mobile money 
retailer and variance LWAI could take any direction. A positive coefficient would indicate that 
access to mobile money shrinks the variability of asset levels across years, which would imply 
that households hold a stable asset base across years as a result of mobile money access. The 
opposite direction could be interpreted as a loss or a gain in productive assets depending on the 
evolution of the LWAI over the 4 rounds of the survey. The previous year’s level of asset 
holdings lag-LWAI should positively affect the current year of asset holding since we limit the 
period between the two wellbeing states to a year.  
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The first and second conditional moments are derived to estimate the probability of a 
household holding a level of asset above a defined threshold ?̅? which is the development 
resilience indicator. We assume a gamma distribution to estimate the probability density 
functions resulting from the conditional moments. Alternative distributions are considered and 
results are reported in Appendix B. The estimates are consistent across specifications based on a 
log-normal distribution. 
o Shocks 
To specifically capture the mutual insurance pathway, we include an interaction term that 
relates the distance to the nearest agent to a negative shock dummy taking the value of 1 for 
moderate to severe shocks and zero otherwise. Negative shocks are rated on a scale ranging from 
1 to 5 from which only levels 3 to 5 are accounted for by the dummy. Moderate to severe shocks 
are preferred for their higher potential to require assistance and their higher likelihood to induce 
asset depletion as households respond more differently to lower magnitude shocks than higher 
magnitude shocks. Formally, we include the interaction term to (24), (26) and (28) as follows: 
𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑘𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
+ 𝛼𝑗𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝜔𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑡 . 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘. 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡                                            (29) 
where Shock denotes the shock dummy and the subscript j takes the values of 1, 2 and 3 
respectively for the first moment, second moment and development resilience equations. 
A negative coefficient estimate 𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑡 would indicate a smaller marginal well-being loss to mobile 
money users relative to their non-user counterparts. 
 Data and descriptive statistics 
The analysis is based on data from a national survey carried out in Kenya over five 
rounds in August-October 2008 (Round 1), October 2009 to January 2010 (Round 2), May to 
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August 2010 (Round 3), March to June 2011 (Round 4) and June to September 2014 (Round 5).  
In year 1, 3000 randomly selected households were interviewed in all regions of Kenya, with 
only 8% of the population not included in the sampling for logistical reasons. As part of the 
survey, mobile money usage and agent data were collected. We exploit data from Round 1, 2, 3 
and 5 since round 4 was not made publicly available.  Table 3.2 summarizes selected statistics by 
survey round. Data form the province of Nairobi was not collected across the four rounds of the 
survey, leading to a relatively high attrition rate in rounds 2, 3 and 5. Our population of 
inference, therefore, excludes the metropolitan area of Nairobi. Additional, Jack and Suri find 
that the attrition rate does not affect the estimation of the effect of mobile money. The final 
sample consists of 1094 households from 6 provinces of Kenya: Central, Eastern, Rift Valley, 
Western, Nyanza, and Coast. 
Table 3.2 Selected statistics by survey rounds 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 5 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2014 
Sample Households 3,000 2,016 1,531 1,688 
Number of Accounts (million users) 4 8 13 25.4 
Access to formal credit (# households)   135 278 
Attrition Rate (% )  33% 49% 44% 
Number of Agents 4,000 16,000 20,000 125,000 
  
One of the assumptions of the theoretical model is poor access to credit markets. Only 
9% of the surveyed households in round 3 have access to a formal credit institution such as 
banks, microfinance institutions or large corporations. This rate increases to 16% in round 5, yet 
it includes the loans that households obtain to finance business expenditures and durable goods. 
In round 5, only 16% of the households that have access to credit were lent an amount for 
emergency purposes, supporting the assumption that the surveyed households are for the most 
borrowing-constrained. 
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Table 3.3 shows the sample summary statistics disaggregated by mobile money usage status. The 
p-value of the mean difference between mobile money users and non-users is reported in row 5 
of each panel. The mobile money user is on average more educated, urban dweller and likely to 
hold a non-farm occupation. These differences trends are consistent across the 4 rounds of the 
survey considered in the analysis. Mobile money users are also younger than their non-users 
counterparts as expected. In round 1 and 3, no significant gender difference is observed in the 
sample, though a higher proportion of male utilizes the mobile money technology. The mean 
household size of the sample is consistent with the average household size of 4 persons in 2014 
reported by United Nations. The household size is comparable across users and non-users in 
rounds 2 and 3. In general, mobile money users differ from non-users counterparts but this gap 
varies across surveys except for education, rural/urban residence and main occupation.  
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Table 3.3 Summary statistics (N = 1061) 
  Age Male Education Rural Farmer Size  
Round 1         
Non User Mean 46.749 0.776 6.890 0.537 0.363 4.791 (1) 
 SD (16.367) (0.417) (4.650) (0.499) (0.481) (2.268) (2) 
User Mean 42.643 0.764 8.565 0.285 0.164 4.300 (3) 
 SD (13.920) (0.425) (5.349) (0.452) (0.371) (2.133) (4) 
Difference p-value 0.000 0.662 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 (5) 
Round 2         
Non User Mean 50.259 0.725 5.574 0.588 0.451 4.787 (1) 
 SD (17.036) (0.447) (4.362) (0.493) (0.498) (2.438) (2) 
User Mean 72.081 0.799 8.396 0.375 0.213 4.825 (3) 
 SD (520.498) (0.401) (5.013) (0.484) (0.410) (2.232) (4) 
Difference p-value 0.451 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.802 (5) 
Round 3         
Non User Mean 50.848 0.769 6.072 0.631 0.435 4.524 (1) 
 SD (16.942) (0.422) (4.369) (0.483) (0.496) (2.517) (2) 
User Mean 45.252 0.816 8.237 0.348 0.215 4.538 (3) 
 SD (13.594) (0.388) (5.125) (0.477) (0.411) (2.174) (4) 
Difference p-value 0.000 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.929 (5) 
Round 5         
Non User Mean 64.342 0.579 4.486 0.895 0.658 3.026 (1) 
 SD (19.577) (0.500) (4.087) (0.311) (0.481) (2.444) (2) 
User Mean 49.734 0.776 7.639 0.424 0.273 5.383 (3) 
 SD (13.468) (0.417) (4.989) (0.494) (0.446) (2.406) (4) 
Difference p-value 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 (5) 
 
These differences coupled with reported self-selection issues lead us to utilize the 
distance separating each household to the nearest mobile money agent as a proxy for mobile 
money use. The justification for this approach is provided in the method section. Table 3.4 
displays the distance summary statistics by survey rounds. The mean distance to the nearest 
mobile money retailer shrinks considerably from the first survey round in 2008 to the 5th round 
in 2014 confirming the fast-growing mobile money agent network in Kenya over this period. 
More importantly, Kenyan households have to travel 17% fewer kilometers to reach a mobile 
money retailer over the period covering the second round of the survey. This increase in 
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coverage between round 1 and 2 is the highest, although the number of mobile money agents in 
the entire country has the most increased between round 3 and 5. The median distance follows a 
similar reduction trend across the survey rounds.  
Table 3.4 Distance summary statistics by survey round (N = 1061) 
Variable Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 5 
Mean (km) 8.09 6.65 5.37 5.01 
Standard deviation 11.81 10.31 9.76 9.44 
Min (km) 0 0 0 0 
First quartile (km) 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.38 
Median (km) 3 2 2 1.5 
Third quartile (km) 10 7 5 5 
Max (km) 70 70 70 70 
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 Results and discussion 
This section presents the results of the model estimations. Table 3.5 presents the 
estimates of the three model specification of the weight equation regression. In all models, the 
ratio of household expenditures to the adjusted poverty line is regressed on a set of explanatory 
variables. Model 2 includes a quadratic term of each variable to the set of explanatory variables 
to account for decreasing marginal returns. In model 3, we allow a year and province fixed 
effects to control for year and location-specific unobserved factors. All equations are estimated 
as a panel by maximum likelihood. 
Tractor and car ownership contribute heavily to livelihood, almost twice the weight of 
farm and non-farm micro-enterprise equipment, both assets making the highest overall 
contribution to livelihood. Households who own this specialized set of equipment are likely to 
spend more relative to their less specialized counterparts. In contrast, it is not surprising that non-
motorized vehicles such as bicycles and carts yield a lower contribution to livelihood. Such 
equipment is own by more than 90% of the surveyed households and makes little difference. The 
education level of the household head and land ownership contribute to livelihood to a lesser 
extent than vehicle and equipment. A striking fact is the negative weight associated with the 
number of adults in the household. This is not surprising when we consider that: (i) it is common 
to observe multiple adults living under the same roof in Sub-Saharan Africa, and (ii) those adults 
are generally unemployed or hold a low paying job, making the marginal contribution of a 
second or third adult to livelihood relatively insignificant. Land improvement and Tropical 
Livestock Units are not statistically significant in the model. The difference in the province 
estimates could reflect the economic disparities between regions of Kenya.  
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Table 3.5 Estimates of the weights equation 
Household livelihood Model 1  
 
Model 2  
 
Model 3  
 
Non motor 1.61 (0.52) *** 1.36 (0.80) * 1.28 (0.81)  
Non-motor2   0.02 (0.08)  0.03 (0.08)  
Vehicle 7.96 (1.10) *** 12.21 (1.89) *** 11.88 (1.90) *** 
Vehicle2   -1.34 (0.45) *** -1.25 (0.45) *** 
Equipment 7.12 (1.50) *** 9.63 (2.82) *** 6.39 (2.88) ** 
Equipment2   -1.40 (1.08)  -0.71 (1.09)  
Land improvement 0.07 (0.16)  0.52 (0.35)  0.30 (0.36)  
Land improvement2   0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  
Adults -3.01 (0.38) *** -8.30 (1.30) *** -8.33 (1.29) *** 
Adults2   0.66 (0.16) *** 0.67 (0.16) *** 
Years of education 0.30 (0.12) ** 0.28 (0.12) ** 0.27 (0.12) ** 
TLU 0.10 (0.17)  0.17 (0.26)  0.33 (0.26)  
TLU2   0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  
Land 0.07 (0.04)  0.18 (0.10) * 0.19 (0.10) ** 
Land2   0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00) * 
Eastern     -5.68 (2.06) *** 
Rift Valley     -3.67 (1.85) ** 
Western     -9.49 (2.05) *** 
Nyanza     -6.67 (1.89) *** 
Coast     -2.45 (2.04)  
Intercept 22.13 (1.53)  29.61 (2.41)  34.43 (2.69)  
Polynomial term No  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effect No  No  Yes  
Province Fixed effect No  No  Yes  
Observations 4325    4325    4325   
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
One concern that could be raised is the absence of variables that capture hours worked 
and savings, factors that also contribute to production. While hours worked can be approximated 
by the number of adults in the household, savings data were not available. Yet, it is worthwhile 
mentioning that (21) is estimated for the main purpose of deriving a set of weights, and less for 
the interest of determining the exact contribution to livelihood. The estimates in Table 3.5 are 
used to compute the LWAI for each household. 
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Figure 3.3 LWAI univariate statistics by survey round 
 
Figure 1 shows the LWAI univariate statistics by survey rounds. The sample presents 
comparable interquartile ranges across survey rounds, with a median lower than 2. Less than 
25% of the households have a LWAI lower than the asset poverty line (LWAI = 1). Although 
households adopt different production technologies that may lead to different productivity level 
for the same asset bundle, we assume that households face the same production technology for 
comparison purposes. That is, the LWAI should not be considered as the poverty level, but as the 
asset bundle that predicts each household poverty level. The median LWAI is larger in round 3 
and 5, and the lowest in round 2.   
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The LWAI is regressed on a polynomial function of lagged LWAI, mobile money and a 
set of household characteristics to investigate the effect of mobile money of development 
resilience. Table 3.6 shows the estimate of the mean, variance and development resilience 
equations. The models are estimated by maximum likelihood as a Poisson regression (mean and 
variance models) and a negative binomial regression (development resilience model). The 
estimates cannot be used to make inferences but offer an insight of the statistically significant 
variables and the direction of the relationship between the outcome of interest and the set of 
covariates. The Development resilience equation estimation has the best fit based on the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and shows statistical significance for all covariates. The 
estimates of the polynomial lag assets support the existence of a nonlinear relationship between 
the asset-based outcomes (mean asset and development resilience) and the previous year’s asset 
level, showing a 1% significance level. Specifically, the negative sign of the quadratic term 
suggests a non-linear asset dynamics path, as in Cissé and Barrett (2018).  
The mobile money access estimate is negative as expected but only statistically 
significant in the development resilience model. The negative sign suggests that households 
closer to a mobile money retailer have a higher likelihood of exceeding the asset poverty line. 
The lack of statistical significance of the mobile money estimate in the mean equation may seem 
surprising. Yet, the mean equation only presents the short-run relationship between mobile 
money and well-being while the development resilience looks at the longer-term ability to 
withstand shocks. Previous mobile money literature found that mobile money contributed to 
smooth consumption in the presence of shocks (Jack and Suri, 2014) but provide no evidence of 
mobile money impact on wealth. A possible explanation to seemingly contradictory results could 
lay in the nature of the outcome. When looking at static measures of well-being, improved risk-
69 
sharing is less likely to affect durable goods such as productive assets. However, in the presence 
of long term stressors, when durables goods are at risk of depletion, improved risk-sharing 
through mobile money could mitigate asset depletion.   
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Table 3.6 Estimates of the mean, variance and resilience equation 
 
Mean 
equation 
 
Variance 
equation 
 
Development 
resilience 
 
lag(LWAI) 0.610 (0.08) *** 0.510 (0.41) 
 
0.421 (0.03) *** 
lag(LWAI)^2 -0.162 (0.03) *** -0.006 (0.15) 
 
-0.031 (0.01) *** 
lag(LWAI)^3 0.016 (0.00) *** -0.005 (0.02) 
 
0.000 (0.00) 
 
Mobile money -0.004 (0.00) 
 
-0.069 (0.04) 
 
-0.052 (0.00) *** 
Male headed -0.001 (0.02) 
 
-0.034 (0.13) 
 
-0.020 (0.00) *** 
Age 0.001 (0.00) 
 
0.084 (0.02) *** 0.064 (0.00) *** 
Age^2 0.000 (0.00) 
 
-0.001 (0.00) *** 0.000 (0.00) *** 
Years of education 0.016 (0.00) *** 0.026 (0.01) ** 0.016 (0.00) *** 
Household size -0.056 (0.00) *** 0.064 (0.03) ** 0.038 (0.00) *** 
Rural 0.055 (0.02) *** -0.065 (0.11) 
 
-0.037 (0.00) *** 
Farmer 0.000 (0.02) 
 
-0.078 (0.13) 
 
-0.052 (0.00) *** 
Shock 0.028 (0.03) 
 
-0.008 (0.20) 
 
-0.006 (0.01) 
 
Shock * Mobile money -0.037 (0.03) 
 
-0.272 (0.19) 
 
-0.178 (0.01) *** 
Round 2 -0.045 (0.02) *** 0.137 (0.14) 
 
0.097 (0.00) *** 
Round 3 0.036 (0.02) ** 0.203 (0.14) 
 
0.134 (0.00) *** 
Round 5 0.089 (0.02) *** 0.500 (0.15) *** 0.340 (0.00) *** 
Eastern -0.175 (0.02) *** 0.411 (0.16) *** 0.342 (0.00) *** 
Rift valley -0.070 (0.02) *** 0.274 (0.17)  0.243 (0.00) *** 
Western -0.307 (0.03) *** 0.321 (0.19) * 0.267 (0.01) *** 
Nyanza -0.156 (0.02) *** 0.391 (0.14) *** 0.335 (0.00) *** 
Coast -0.047 (0.02) ** 0.277 (0.16) * 0.238 (0.00) *** 
Intercept 0.192 (0.10) ** -5.255 (0.64) *** -3.956 (0.03) *** 
N 
3107 
 
3107 
 
3130 
 
BIC 
-24144.091 
 
-21957.067 
 
-25013.466 
 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
The interaction term between shocks and mobile money is added to the model 
specification to investigate the impact of mobile money on asset holdings when facing a severe 
shock. Consequently, we consider shocks rated as severe (3 to 5 on a scale of 5) by the surveyed 
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households. As shown in Figure 2, most households would avoid selling their assets to cope with 
a shock until they face a severe shock, relying on savings and other coping mechanisms on less 
severe shocks. Because severe shocks have usually a lasting effect on households, they will more 
likely affect resilience. The estimate of the interaction term is statistically significant in the 
resilience equation, confirming that mobile money reduces the probability of asset depletion in 
the presence of severe shocks. 
  
 
Figure 3.4 Households responses to shocks by levels of shock severity 
 
The negative estimate of the interaction term is in Table 3.6 can be interpreted as the 
additional shock effect induced by the access to a mobile money agent. Because this additional 
effect increases with distance in absolute value, households living closer to a mobile money 
agent are less vulnerable to severe shocks than lower mobile money access households, 
consistent with Jack and Suri (2014).  
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Table 3.7 Marginal effects of the mean, variance and development resilience equations 
Panel A: Marginal effects of the mean equation 
 Poverty line  Median  Third quartile  
Lag(LWAI) 0.521 (0.05) *** 0.327 (0.03) *** 0.218 (0.03) *** 
Mobile money -0.009 (0.01) 
 
-0.011 (0.01) 
 
-0.012 (0.01) 
 
Shock*Mobile.M -0.058 (0.04)   -0.072 (0.06)  -0.077 (0.06)  
Gender -0.002 (0.03) 
 
-0.003 (0.03) 
 
-0.003 (0.03) 
 
Age -0.002 (0.00) * -0.002 (0.00) * -0.002 (0.00) * 
Education 0.025 (0.00) *** 0.030 (0.00) *** 0.033 (0.00) *** 
Household size -0.087 (0.01) *** -0.108 (0.01) *** -0.116 (0.01) *** 
Rural 0.086 (0.03) *** 0.106 (0.03) *** 0.114 (0.03) *** 
Farmer 0.000 (0.03) 
 
0.000 (0.03) 
 
0.000 (0.04) 
 
N 3099  3099  3099  
 
Panel B: Marginal effects of the variance equation 
 Poverty line  Median  Third quartile  
Lag(LWAI) 0.135 (0.04) *** 0.180 (0.04) *** 0.203 (0.05) *** 
Mobile money -0.023 (0.01) ** -0.035 (0.02) ** -0.043 (0.02) ** 
Shock*Mobile.M -0.076 (0.05)   -0.113 (0.08)  -0.140(0.09)   
Gender -0.009 (0.03) 
 
-0.014 (0.05) 
 
-0.017 (0.07) 
 
Age 0.006 (0.00) *** 0.009 (0.00) *** 0.011 (0.00) *** 
Education 0.007 (0.00) ** 0.011 (0.00) ** 0.013 (0.01) ** 
Household size 0.018 (0.01) ** 0.026 (0.01) ** 0.033 (0.01) ** 
Rural -0.018 (0.03) 
 
-0.027 (0.05) 
 
-0.033 (0.06) 
 
Farmer -0.022 (0.04) 
 
-0.032 (0.05) 
 
-0.040 (0.06) 
 
N 3099  3099  3099  
 
Panel C: Marginal effects of the development resilience equation 
 Poverty line  Median  Third quartile  
Lag(LWAI) 0.066 (0.00) *** 0.063 (0.00) *** 0.058 (0.00) *** 
Mobile money -0.012 (0.00) *** -0.013 (0.00) *** -0.014 (0.00) *** 
Shock*Mobile.M -0.033 (0.00) *** -0.037 (0.00) *** -0.039 (0.00) *** 
Gender -0.004 (0.00) *** -0.004 (0.00) *** -0.004 (0.00) *** 
Age 0.003 (0.00) *** 0.004 (0.00) *** 0.004 (0.00) *** 
Education 0.003 (0.00) *** 0.003 (0.00) *** 0.004 (0.00) *** 
Household size 0.007 (0.00) *** 0.008 (0.00) *** 0.008 (0.00) *** 
Rural -0.007 (0.00) *** -0.008 (0.00) *** -0.008 (0.00) *** 
Farmer -0.010 (0.00) *** -0.011 (0.00) *** -0.011 (0.00) *** 
N 3099  3099  3099  
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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 Marginal effects 
The marginal effects of each equation are estimated at the poverty line, the median and 
the third quartile and reported in table 3.7. Panel A reports the marginal effects of the mean 
equation while panels B and C present the marginal effects of the variance and development 
resilience equations. The coefficient estimate on lag asset is statistically significant and 
decreasing in magnitude with quartiles in both mean and resilience equations. For households at 
the poverty line, the return to an additional index unit of productive assets is more than twice as 
of the third quartile. In contrast the education estimate at the third quartile exceeds is higher than 
at the poverty line. This could suggest that poorer households maximize returns to tangible while 
wealthier households maximize returns on human capital. As one would expect, previous asset 
holdings play a more prominent role in the probability of the poorer households to exceed the 
poverty line by 6 percentage points relative to the households at the third quartile of the LWAI. 
Mobile money was found to affect the current level of assets only when households face severe 
shocks as shown in Panel A of Table 3.7. This result somewhat contradicts the finding of  Suri 
and Jack (2016) where the monetary value of household assets was used as a proxy for well-
being, though their study does not primarily focus on the relationship between wealth and 
negative shocks. As predicted by the theoretical model, households facing a negative income 
shock could draw on a wider network of individuals to receive assistance. This would especially 
prevent households who adopt a consumption smoothing strategy to deplete their productive 
assets to maintain their level of consumption. The mobile money estimates of the variance 
equation show a positive relationship between mobile money access and LWAI variance. While 
this result may look surprising, these could be drawn by users that experienced large changes in 
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their asset holdings during this period. For example, a large increase in asset holdings could be 
captured by these estimates. 
The estimates in Panel C (Table 3.7) suggest that a 10 km reduction in the distance 
separating households to the nearest mobile money agent increases the probability of exceeding 
the poverty line by 1 percentage points. This result has important implications for households in 
the vicinity of the poverty line, as mobile money could prevent them from falling to a lower 
equilibrium. Additionally, mobile money users facing severe shocks are by 3 percentage points 
less likely to fall under the poverty line. This effect increases to 4 km for households in the 3rd 
quartile. 
 LWAI Dynamics 
 
Figure 3.5 Predicted LWAI dynamics 
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The LWAI path dynamics are presented in Figure 2 from which two conclusions could be drawn. 
First, LWAI dynamics are non-linear, consistent with previous research on poverty traps. 
However, we find no evidence of multiple equilibrium poverty traps as suggested by previous 
research.  A single steady-state equilibrium poverty traps is established at about 2 LWAI, as 
suggested in recent research on TLU dynamics (Cissé and Barrett, 2018; Phadera et al., 2019). 
The estimated steady-state equilibrium is higher than the static poverty line used to generate the 
livelihood asset weights. While this may seem surprising, a plausible interpretation of this higher 
poverty line level could be an underestimation of the minimum income that categorizes 
households as poor.  
  
76 
 Conclusion 
Despite empirical evidence of the positive impact of mobile money on welfare, much of 
the empirical literature has not tested the long-run impact of mobile money on the ability to 
withstand shocks. Static measures of welfare based on consumption seem limited to determine 
the effect of mobile money on resilience, especially for households that adopt a consumption 
smoothing strategy. In this study, we estimate the impact of the distance to the nearest mobile 
money approach on household resilience using the development resilience indicator proposed by 
Barrett and Constas (2014). We found that a 10 km reduction in the distance separating 
households from the nearest mobile money retailer results in a percentage point increase in 
development resilience. Moreover, wealthier households are more likely to benefit from higher 
access to mobile money. When facing severe shocks, mobile money users were found capable of 
sustaining a higher probability of exceeding the asset poverty line than their non-user 
counterparts. These findings establish new evidence on the long-run effect of digital payments. 
The external validity of the findings is limited by the particularity of Kenya as the leading Sub-
Saharan African country in adoption of digital payments. The high penetration of the technology 
and the longer period of exposure of households from all regions suggests that Kenyan 
households are more likely to use digital payments for various purposes. This is not necessarily 
true in countries where households are not yet acquainted with the technology. Interestingly, our 
forward-looking approach could allow us to predict the impact of mobile money on resilience at 
increasing levels of adoption in other countries.  
The policy implications of these findings revolve around the facilitation of the expansion 
of digital technologies Because digital payments are found to have a long-run effect on 
resilience, their potential should not be hindered policies focusing on shorter terms outcomes. 
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Observing the rapid expansion of this technology, various countries envision fiscal policies 
aiming at increasing sales tax in this sector. While such policies may generate substantial 
revenues in the short run, the potential effects on vulnerable populations benefiting from this 
technology should be carefully considered. Depending on the behavioral response to taxation, it 
could undermine the potential of digital payment to strengthen resilience in areas where 
vulnerable populations are still struggling to meet their basing needs. As a risk management 
enhancing tool, mobile money could also complement the new or existing financial services 
being offered in rural areas. 
One caveat to the methods hinges on the period covered by the datasets. As pointed by 
the poverty trap literature, sufficient time periods should be considered to effectively observe 
household welfare dynamics. Our dataset covering four rounds of survey including one-time 
period of lag limit the number of time periods to three, which may not allow us to accurately 
observe welfare dynamics and make accurate inferences. Another area of concern is the ability of 
the asset index to accurately capture welfare dynamic, particularly in the absence of data on 
savings and cash on hand. Finally, although our model predicts the average effect of mobile 
money on resilience at various levels of wealth, we still see the impact of the technology on asset 
smoothing households as a puzzle. Further studies could fruitfully explore these areas. 
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Chapter 4 - Conclusion 
The two essays of this dissertation address two key issues: the impact of mobile money on 
smallholder market participation and resilience to shocks and stressors. The first essay develops 
and tests a conceptual model based on a transaction costs economics framework to explain how 
digital payments improve market participation. The estimation of a special regressor model 
shows that access to mobile money is associated with a reduction of the information asymmetry 
around the buyer type and an enhanced gain from distant market participation. The predictions of 
the conceptual model are empirically tested using an instrumental variable approach and 
secondary data from a cross-sectional survey conducted by the Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor (CGAP) in Cote d’Ivoire and Tanzania. We specifically find that the probability of distant 
market participation is increased on average by 55 percentage points for mobile money users. 
Digital payments offer an innovative solution for addressing market failures due to high 
transaction costs, offering a new perspective to policymakers to improve efficiency in value 
chains and facilitate market linkages. 
The second essay investigates the risk-sharing effect of mobile money on household 
development resilience. We first construct a multidimensional index of well-being based on 
productive assets holdings and empirically investigate the effect of mobile money on household 
development resilience using a conditional moment approach. The key findings suggest that a 10 
km reduction in the distance separating households from the nearest mobile money retailer 
results in a percentage point increase in development resilience. Moreover, wealthier households 
are more likely to benefit from higher access to mobile money. The second essays contribute to 
the literature by establishing new evidence of the long-run effect of mobile money. In addition, 
by focusing on productive assets, this study provides evidence of a relationship between mobile 
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money and risk management of income-generating activities. There are two major implications 
of this study. First, because digital payments are found to have a long-run effect on resilience, 
their potential should not be hindered policies focusing on shorter terms outcomes. Second, 
mobile money could complement the new or existing financial services being offered in rural 
areas for more sustainable effects. 
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Appendix A -  
Table A.1 Mobile money model estimation (bivariate probit) 
Dependent variable:  
Mobile money 
   
Land size 0.459 ** 
 (0.216)  
Access to agent 0.132  
 (0.113)  
Remittance 0.054 *** 
 (0.011)  
Rainfall deviation -0.144  
 (0.200)  
Household size 0.001  
 (0.017)  
Male 0.084  
 (0.095)  
Age 0.022  
 (0.019)  
Age squared 0.000  
 (0.000)  
Land size 0.001  
 (0.001)  
Rural -0.221 ** 
 (0.097)  
Tanzania 0.217 ** 
 (0.106)  
*, **, ** denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table A.2 Marginal effects of the Special regressor model with additional variables 
Dependent variable: Market 
participation  
Rainfall deviation 0.445 *** 
 (0.140)  
Mobile money 0.575 ** 
 (0.287)  
Household size -0.001  
 (0.003)  
Household size -0.012  
 (0.024)  
Male 0.000  
 (0.005)  
Age 0.000  
 (0.000)  
Age squared 0.018  
 (0.023)  
Land size -0.016  
 (0.039)  
Rural 0.010  
 (0.022)  
Experience 0.002  
 (0.002)  
Land size 0.000  
 (0.000)  
Price information -0.001  
 (0.001)  
Rice 0.034  
 (0.035)  
Tanzania -0.082 ** 
 (0.038)  
Livestock -0.002  
 (0.022)  
Intercept -0.047  
 (0.122)  
*, **, ** denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table A.3 Marginal effects of the Special regressor model with additional variables 
Dependent variable: Market 
participation  
Rainfall deviation 0.054  
 (0.047)  
Mobile money 0.459 *** 
 (0.148)  
Household size 0.011 ** 
 (0.005)  
Household size 0.040  
 (0.027)  
Male 0.002  
 (0.005)  
Age 0.000  
 (0.000)  
Age squared 0.007  
 (0.027)  
Land size -0.064  
 (0.047)  
Rural -0.102 *** 
 (0.028)  
Experience -0.003  
 (0.003)  
Land size 0.000  
 (0.000)  
Price information 0.001  
 (0.001)  
Rice 0.081 ** 
 (0.032)  
Tanzania 0.014  
 (0.036)  
Livestock -0.011  
*, **, ** denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Appendix B -  
Figure B.1 Kernel density of the LWAI 
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Figure B.2 Kernel density of the Predicted probabilities 
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Table B.4 Estimation based on Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) 
  Mean equation 
Variance 
Equation 
Development 
resilience 
lag(LWAI) 0.505 
(0.08) 
*** 0.166 
(0.41) 
 
0.330 
(0.03) 
*** 
lag(LWAI)^2 -0.127 
(0.03) 
*** -0.007 
(0.15) 
 
-0.093 
(0.01) 
*** 
lag(LWAI)^3 0.012 
(0.00) 
*** 0.005 
(0.02) 
 
0.015 
(0.00) 
*** 
Mobile money -0.005 
(0.01) 
 
-0.063 
(0.04) 
 
-0.048 
(0.00) 
*** 
Male headed 0.002 
(0.02) 
 
0.058 
(0.12) 
 
0.040 
(0.00) 
*** 
Age -0.001 
(0.00) 
** 0.018 
(0.00) 
*** 0.013 
(0.00) 
*** 
Age^2 0.000 
(0.00) 
** 0.000 
(0.00) 
*** 0.000 
(0.00) 
*** 
Years of education 0.016 
(0.00) 
*** 0.037 
(0.01) 
*** 0.025 
(0.00) 
*** 
Household size -0.053 
(0.00) 
*** 0.063 
(0.03) 
** 0.038 
(0.00) 
*** 
Rural 0.052 
(0.02) 
*** -0.144 
(0.11) 
 
-0.089 
(0.00) 
*** 
Farmer -0.011 
(0.02) 
 
-0.130 
(0.12) 
 
-0.085 
(0.00) 
*** 
Shock -0.015 
(0.03) 
 
-0.186 
(0.18) 
 
-0.124 
(0.01) 
*** 
Shock * Mobile money -0.037 
(0.02) 
* -0.372 
(0.24) 
 
-0.247 
(0.01) 
*** 
Round 2 -0.020 
(0.01) 
 
0.163 
(0.15) 
 
0.114 
(0.00) 
*** 
Round 3 0.060 
(0.02) 
*** 0.331 
(0.16) 
** 0.221 
(0.00) 
*** 
Round 4 0.116 
(0.02) 
*** 0.685 
(0.14) 
*** 0.470 
(0.00) 
*** 
Eastern -0.172 
(0.03) 
*** 0.352 
(0.17) 
** 0.300 
(0.01) 
*** 
Rift valley -0.077 
(0.02) 
*** 0.225 
(0.16) 
 
0.211 
(0.00) 
*** 
Western -0.335 
(0.03) 
*** 0.114 
(0.18) 
 
0.128 
(0.01) 
*** 
Nyanza -0.155 
(0.02) 
*** 0.360 
(0.16) 
** 0.313 
(0.00) 
*** 
Coast -0.060 
(0.02) 
*** 0.181 
(0.18) 
 
0.175 
(0.01) 
*** 
88 
Intercept 
0.313 
(0.08) *** 
-3.140 
(0.45) *** 
-2.458 
(0.02) *** 
N 3095  3095  3119  
BIC 
-
24015.468  
-
21694.629  
-
24913.454  
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Table B.5 Estimation using 4 lags 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   
lag(LWAI) 0.735 
(0.14) 
*** 0.586 
(0.63) 
 
0.682 
(0.06) 
*** 
lag(LWAI)^2 -0.242 
(0.08) 
*** -0.059 
(0.40) 
 
-0.208 
(0.03) 
*** 
lag(LWAI)^3 0.035 
(0.02) 
* 0.009 
(0.10) 
 
0.045 
(0.01) 
*** 
lag(LWAI)^4 -0.002 
(0.00) 
 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
 
-0.004 
(0.00) 
*** 
Mobile money -0.004 
(0.00) 
 
-0.067 
(0.04) 
 
-0.051 
(0.00) 
*** 
Male headed -0.002 
(0.02) 
 
-0.034 
(0.13) 
 
-0.021 
(0.00) 
*** 
Age 0.001 
(0.00) 
 
0.084 
(0.02) 
*** 0.064 
(0.00) 
*** 
Age^2 0.000 
(0.00) 
 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
*** 0.000 
(0.00) 
*** 
Years of education 0.016 
(0.00) 
*** 0.025 
(0.01) 
** 0.016 
(0.00) 
*** 
Household size -0.056 
(0.00) 
*** 0.063 
(0.03) 
** 0.038 
(0.00) 
*** 
Rural 0.055 
(0.02) 
*** -0.065 
(0.11) 
 
-0.037 
(0.00) 
*** 
Farmer 0.000 
(0.02) 
 
-0.077 
(0.13) 
 
-0.051 
(0.00) 
*** 
Shock * Mobile money -0.037 
(0.03) 
 
-0.273 
(0.19) 
 
-0.179 
(0.01) 
*** 
Round 2 -0.045 
(0.02) 
*** 0.136 
(0.14) 
 
0.097 
(0.00) 
*** 
Round 3 0.037 
(0.02) 
** 0.201 
(0.14) 
 
0.133 
(0.00) 
*** 
Round 4 0.090 
(0.02) 
*** 0.498 
(0.15) 
*** 0.340 
(0.00) 
*** 
Eastern -0.177 
(0.02) 
*** 0.413 
(0.16) 
*** 0.341 
(0.00) 
*** 
Rift valley -0.072 
(0.02) 
*** 0.277 
(0.17) 
 
0.243 
(0.00) 
*** 
Western -0.308 
(0.03) 
*** 0.326 
(0.19) 
* 0.269 
(0.01) 
*** 
Nyanza -0.159 
(0.02) 
*** 0.395 
(0.14) 
*** 0.334 
(0.00) 
*** 
Coast -0.049 
(0.02) 
** 0.277 
(0.16) 
* 0.236 
(0.00) 
*** 
Intercept 0.135 
(0.11) 
 
-5.279 
(0.61) 
*** -4.058 
(0.04) 
*** 
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N 3107  3107  3130 
 
BIC -
24136.338 
 -
21944.393 
 -
25005.473 
 
 
